much good these would have been against the "universally worshipped Mahdi" in extricating those who had surrendered to him — why did they stay on? Did not Gordon beg them to leave? did he not try and compel them to do so? did he not put boats at their disposal to sail north or south as best suited them? And has not Gordon himself given the real reason for their staying on? — though to this should be added their unbounded faith and confidence in Gordon.
Gordon, I venture to believe, sustained his reputation in the Soudan up to the end — up to the moment when, with the hand of Death on him, he fell facing his last assailant. True, he lost his reputation for telling the truth, but there are few men in this world whose telling of an untruth would startle and astonish a community. The people of Khartoum, their eyes dry and wearied with looking for a sign of the returning steamers which Gordon had sent off three months before to bring up the troops expected to arrive at the beginning of November, turned to each other, and, in an amazed whisper, said, "Gordon has told a lie," and were startled and afraid at their own words.
Having dealt as tersely as possible with this curious collection of contradictions, I proceed to the quotation of and replies to the criticisms passed upon Gordon in the book I have already quoted from.
1. "Looking back on the events of the siege of Khartoum, I cannot refrain from saying I consider Gordon carried his humanitarian views too far, and this excessive forbearance on his part added to his difficulties,"
2. "It was Gordon's first and paramount duty to rescue the