Page:A biographical dictionary of eminent Scotsmen, vol 7.djvu/29

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DR. THOMAS REID.
165


per, moderation, and good manners." But his liberal mind did not permit him, on seeing the manuscript, and knowing the worth of its author, to yield to his hasty anticipations. Writing personally to Reid, he said, " By Dr Blair's means I have been favoured with the perusal of your performance, which I have read with great pleasure and attention. It is certainly very rare, that a piece so deeply philosophical, is wrote with so much spirit, and affords so much entertainment to the reader, though I must still regret the disadvantages under which I read it, as I never had the whole performance at once before me, and could not be able fully to compare one part with another. To this reason chiefly I attribute some obscurities, which, in spite of your short analysis or abstract, still seem to hang over your system. For I must do you the justice to own, that, when I enter into your ideas, no man appears to express himself with greater perspicuity than you do ; a talent which, above all others, is requisite in that species of literature which you have cultivated. There are some objections, which I would willingly propose, to the chapter Of Sight, did I not suspect that they proceed from my not sufficiently understanding it; and I am the more confirmed in this suspicion, as Dr Black tells me that the former objections I had made, had been derived chiefly from that cause. I shall, therefore, forbear till the whole can be before me, and shall not at present propose any farther difficulties to your reasonings. I shall only say, that if you have been able to clear up these abstruse and important subjects, instead of being mortified, I shall be so vain as to pretend to a share of the praise; and shall think that my errors, by having at least some coherence, had led you to make a more strict review of my principles, which were the common ones, and to perceive their futility."

It may be as well here to pass over the intervening events of Dr Reid's life, and give a brief sketch of the principles of his philosophy, as developed in his other works, to which, as Mr Stewart has properly remarked, the Inquiry into the Human Mind forms an introduction. In 1785, he published his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," and in 1788, those on the "Active Powers." These two have been generally republished together, under the well known title, "Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind;" a work which has gradually gained ground in the estimation of intelligent thinkers, and is now used as a text book by many eminent teachers of philosophy. When it is said that Dr Reid's philosophy is entirely, or intended to be entirely synthetical, and that it adopts no theory, except as an induction from experiment, it will readily be understood, that a view of its general principles and tendency cannot be given; but it is not on this account very difficult to describe the method by which he reasoned, and came to the different conclusions he has adopted. Reid has generally received, and probably with justice, the praise of having been the first to extend, by a general system, the process of reasoning from experiment, so strongly recommended by Bacon in natural science, to the operations of the mind. In this he was, to a certain extent, anticipated by Hume, who, especially in his arguments on cause and effect, and his essay on miracles, proceeded on analyses of our experience: but the two philosophers followed a different method; the sceptic using his experience to show the futility of any systems of philosophy which had been raised; while Reid made use of them to redeem, as it were, mental science, by eschewing these systems, and founding one of his own on that experience which he saw had enabled the sceptic to demolish the systems, destitute of such a support. But to accomplish his purpose and this is what distinguishes his philosophy from all other systems Reid found it necessary to set bounds to his inquiries, which other philosophers had passed. He abstained from that speculation concerning the nature and