Page:Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al. v. Roberta G. DeVries, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et al..pdf/17

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Cite as: 586 U. S. ___ (2019)
3

Gorsuch, J., dissenting

whether a manufacturer’s product happens to be (or is designed to be) “integrated” with another’s. Instead, it is black-letter law that the supplier of a product generally must warn about only those risks associated with the product itself, not those associated with the “products and systems into which [it later may be] integrated.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §5, Comment b, p. 132 (1997).[1]

More than that, the traditional common law rule still makes the most sense today. The manufacturer of a product is in the best position to understand and warn users about its risks; in the language of law and economics, those who make products are generally the least-cost avoiders of their risks. By placing the duty to warn on a product’s manufacturer, we force it to internalize the full cost of any injuries caused by inadequate warnings–and in that way ensure it is fully incentivized to provide adequate warnings. By contrast, we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn about the dangers of its products when we require other people to share the duty to warn and its corresponding costs. See S. Shavell, Economic
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    288, 305 (1999); Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 209 Mich. App. 136, 144–146, 530 N. W. 2d 510, 514–515 (1995); Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N. Y. 2d 289, 297–298, 591 N. E. 2d 222, 225–226 (1992); Walton v. Harnischfeger, 796 S. W. 2d 225, 226 (Tex. App. 1990); Toth v. Economy Forms Corp., 391 Pa. Super. 383, 388–389, 571 A. 2d 420, 423 (1990); Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 631–632, 487 N. E. 2d 1374, 1376 (1986); Johnson v. Jones-Blair Paint Co., 607 S. W. 2d 305, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); 63A Am. Jur. 2d, Products Liability §1027, p. 247 (2010); Behrens & Horn, Liability for Asbestos-Containing Connected or Replacement Parts Made by Third-Parties: Courts Are Properly Rejecting This Form of Guilt by Association, 37 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 489, 494–497 (2014).

  1. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F. 3d 376, 379 (CA1 2000); Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F. 3d 701, 703–704 (CA8 1993); Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F. 2d 45, 48–49 (CA6 1989); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F. 2d 700, 715 (CA5 1986).