Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Analysis of Accident Law 17 (1987); G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 135, and n. 1 (1970); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U. S. 315, 324 (1964).[1]
The traditional common law rule better accords, too, with consumer expectations. A home chef who buys a butcher’s knife may expect to read warnings about the dangers of knives but not about the dangers of under-cooked meat. Likewise, a purchaser of gasoline may expect to see warnings at the pump about its flammability but not about the dangers of recklessly driving a car. As the Court today recognizes, encouraging manufacturers to offer warnings about other people’s products risks long, duplicative, fine print, and conflicting warnings that will leave consumers less sure about which to take seriously and more likely to disregard them all. In the words of the California Supreme Court, consumer welfare is not well “served by requiring manufacturers to warn about the dangerous propensities of products they do not design, make, or sell.” O’Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal. 4th 335, 343, 266 P. 3d 987, 991 (2012); see also Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F. 2d 935, 938 (CADC 1988) (“The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each other
- ↑ See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §5, Comment a, p. 131 (1997) (“If the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground” that others “utiliz[e] the component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective”); Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F. 3d 484, 490 (CA7 1995) (placing liability on a defendant who is not “in the best position to prevent a particular class of accidents” may “dilute the incentives of other potential defendants” who should be the first “line of defense”); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, D. C., 5 F. 3d 554, 557 (CADC 1993) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“Placing liability with the least-cost avoider increases the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures” that will “have the greatest marginal effect on preventing the loss”).
