Nelson just prior to the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, but the French Admiral Villeneuve[1][2] confidently asserted in a note issued to his staff in anticipation of the battle that:—"The British Fleet will not be formed in a line-of-battle parallel to the combined fleet according to the usage of former days. Nelson, assuming him to be, as represented, really in command, will seek to break our line, envelop our rear, and overpower with groups of his ships as many as he can isolate and cut off." Here we have a concise statement of a definite tactical scheme based on a clear understanding of the advantages of fire concentration.
It will be understood by those acquainted with the sailing-ship of the period that the van could only turn to come to the assistance of those in the rear at the cost of a considerable interval of time, especially if the van should happen to be to leeward of the centre and rear. The time taken to "wear ship," or in light winds to "go about" (often only to be effected by manning the boats and rowing to assist the manoeuvre), was by no means an inconsiderable item. Thus it would not uncommonly be a matter of some hours before the leading ships could be brought within decisive range, and take an active part in the fray.
§ 41. Nelson's Memorandum, and Tactical Scheme. In order further to embarass the enemy's van, and more effectively to prevent it from coming into action, it became part of the scheme of attack that a few ships, a comparatively insignificant force, should be told off to intercept and engage as many of the leading ships as possible; in brief, to fight an independent action on a small scale; we may say admittedly a losing action. In this connection Nelson's memorandum of October 9 is illuminating. Nelson assumed for the purpose of framing
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- ↑ "The Enemy at Trafalgar," Ed. Fraser; Hodder and Stoughton, page 54.
- ↑ Fraser Edward: The Enemy at Trafalgar: the Battle From the Perspective of the French & Spanish Navies and Their Sailors (1906) (Wikisource contributor note)
