Thus we are led to appreciate the commanding importance of a correct tactical scheme. If in the actual battle the old-time method of attack had been adopted, it is extremely doubtful whether the superior seamanship and gunnery of the British could have averted defeat. The actual forces on the day were 27 British sail of the line against the combined fleet numbering 33, a rather less favourable ratio than assumed in the Memorandum. In the battle, as it took place, the British attacked in two columns instead of three, as laid down in the Memorandum; but the scheme of concentration followed the original idea. The fact that the wind was of the lightest was alone sufficient to determine the exclusion of the enemy's van from the action. However, as a study the Memorandum is far more important than the actual event, and in the foregoing analysis it is truly remarkable to find, firstly, the definite statement of the cutting the enemy into two equal parts—according to the n-square law the exact proportion corresponding to the reduction of his total effective strength to a minimum; and, secondly, the selection of a proportion, the nearest whole-number equivalent to the √2 ratio of theory, required to give a fighting strength equal to tackling the two halves of the enemy on level terms, and the detachment of the remainder, the column of eight sail, to weaken and impede the leading half of the enemy's fleet to guarantee the success of the main idea. If, as might fairly be assumed, the foregoing is more than a coincidence,[1] it suggests itself that Nelson, if not actually acquainted with the n-square law, must have had some equivalent basis on which to figure his tactical values.
- ↑ Although we may take it to be a case in which the dictates of experience resulted in a disposition now confirmed by theory, the agreement is remarkable.
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