his efforts are unlikely to be wholly effective; in thick weather the whole of a belligerent air fleet might pass over his territory without once being sighted. Hence it will be possible that at any time he may be plausibly accused of favouring one side or the other, and thus find himself in difficulties of a diplomatic kind far worse than would have been possible had he left his air undefended. A host of other difficulties spring into one's mind in connection with the defence of territorial air by a neutral Power; aircraft may encounter above the clouds: a belligerent fleet and the neutral air-sentry force. How shall they decide in what way to act? They cannot stand still and hold a palaver whilst the matter is tested by a plumb-line. Clearly any attempt to enforce neutrality in territorial air would be more likely to drag the neutral Power into the war on one side or the other than a rigid abstinence from interference; and since this is one of the most important contingencies to be guarded against,[1] it seems evident that, as a matter of expediency, the rights (if they be admitted) of neutrals over their territorial air should be regarded as not involving any obligation of action against belligerent aircraft. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the ordinary powers of enforcing restrictions in such matters as flying over prohibited areas, etc., will in nowise be weakened by the existence of a state of war, and neither belligerent will have cause for complaint if his aircraft, after due warning, should be fired upon. In brief, whilst it would appear to be impossible to deny the right to a neutral of chasing away—or, if necessary, even of destroying—belligerent aircraft if found in occupation of territorial air, it would appear to be equally impossible to impose the duty of doing so as an obligation. A
- ↑ It is, in fact, one of the main benefits of an international code that the friction between neutrals and belligerents should be minimised.
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