Page:Aircraft in Warfare (1916).djvu/248

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§ 123
AIRCRAFT IN WARFARE.

The possible need for abandoning the present capital as the centre of administration in wartime carries with it as a corollary its abandonment equally in time of peace, at least so far as the control of the Army and Navy is concerned; since, on the declaration of war, or even without a formal declaration, the aircraft of the enemy may already be mobilised for an attack. Of course our premises are hypothetical, we have no proof yet that the adequate defence of London from hostile aircraft will actually become impossible, but equally it is clear that the contingency may have to be faced, and therefore it is one that must be taken seriously.

§ 124. The Question of Fire Risk. Apart from the active defence provided by a numerically strong and vigilant air fleet, the most important factor in the protection of a city from hostile aircraft is to be sought in the prevention of fire. Thus a city in which fire-proof or fire-resisting construction is extensively employed, and in which a town-planning scheme has been adopted with a view to the localisation of any conflagration that may get out of hand, will be far safer and more easily defended than one in which these precautions are not taken. It goes without saying that all the usual appliances for dealing with the outbreak of fire should be liberally provided in any case. The greater and more thorough the precautions, the less probability will there be of the enemy attack being successful, and the larger the scale on which it will have to be conducted to have any hope of success; conversely the easier will be rendered the effective defence. It is to be understood that the word success as here used is measured by whether or no the extent of

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    be given as an excuse for a subsequent repetition of the original offence. It is thus detrimental to the cause of humanity to tie the hands of a belligerent by international convention. Such conventions result in delays whilst law officers are consulted and whilst committees are called and decisions are reached; also they result in no preparations being made for counter measures such as comprehended by the word reprisal. The power of reprisal and the knowledge that the means of reprisal exists will ever be a far greater deterrent than any pseudo-legal document.