Opinion of the Court
State in the country, meanwhile, “has attained a proportional share” of districts in which Hispanic-preferred candidates are likely to prevail. Id., at 3–4. That is because as residential segregation decreases—as it has “sharply” done since the 1970s—satisfying traditional districting criteria such as the compactness requirement “becomes more difficult.” T. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70 Duke L. J. 261, 279, and n. 105 (2020).
Indeed, as amici supporting the appellees emphasize, §2 litigation in recent years has rarely been successful for just that reason. See Chen Brief 3–4. Since 2010, plaintiffs nationwide have apparently succeeded in fewer than ten §2 suits. Id., at 7. And “the only state legislative or congressional districts that were redrawn because of successful Section 2 challenges were a handful of state house districts near Milwaukee and Houston.” Id., at 7–8. By contrast, “[n]umerous lower courts” have upheld districting maps “where, due to minority populations’ geographic diffusion, plaintiffs couldn’t design an additional majority-minority district” or satisfy the compactness requirement. Id., at 15–16 (collecting cases). The same has been true of recent litigation in this Court. See Abbott, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 33–34) (finding a Texas district did not violate §2 because “the geography and demographics of south and west Texas do not permit the creation of any more than the seven Latino … districts that exist under the current plan”).[1]
- ↑ Despite this all, the dissent argues that courts have apparently been “methodically carving the country into racially designated electoral districts” for decades. Post, at 48 (opinion of Thomas, J.). And that, the dissent inveighs, “should inspire us to repentance.” Ibid. But proportional representation of minority voters is absent from nearly every corner of this country despite §2 being in effect for over 40 years. And in case after case, we have rejected districting plans that would bring States closer to proportionality when those plans violate traditional districting criteria. See supra, at 19–21. It seems it is the dissent that is “quixotically joust[ing] with an imaginary adversary.” Post, at 47 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
