Opinion of Roberts, C. J.
Reapportionment, we have repeatedly observed, “is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State[s],” not the federal courts. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 21). Properly applied, the Gingles factors help ensure that remains the case. As respondents themselves emphasize, §2 “never require[s] adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles.” Brief for Respondents in No. 21–1087, p. 3. Its exacting requirements, instead, limit judicial intervention to “those instances of intensive racial politics” where the “excessive role [of race] in the electoral process … den[ies] minority voters equal opportunity to participate.” Senate Report 33–34.
B
Although we are content to reject Alabama’s invitation to change existing law on the ground that the State misunderstands §2 and our decisions implementing it, we also address how the race-neutral benchmark would operate in practice. Alabama’s approach fares poorly on that score, which further counsels against our adopting it.
1
The first change to existing law that Alabama would require is prohibiting the illustrative maps that plaintiffs submit to satisfy the first Gingles precondition from being “based” on race. Brief for Alabama 56. Although Alabama is not entirely clear whether, under its view, plaintiffs’ illustrative plans must not take race into account at all or whether they must just not “prioritize” race, ibid., we see no reason to impose such a new rule.
When it comes to considering race in the context of districting, we have made clear that there is a difference “between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them.” Miller, 515 U. S., at 916; see also North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (per curiam) (slip op., at 8). The former is permissible; the latter
