- 3. Maintenance of the same level of Military Assistance Program funding for Korea as before the deployment of the division.
- 4. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac area, command channels, and logistical support for Korean combat units destined for service in Vietnam.
- 5. Establishment of a small planning group to determine the organization of the Korean division.
- 6. Provision of signal equipment for a direct and exclusive communication net between Korea and Korean forces headquarters in Vietnam.
- 7. Provision of transportation for the movement of the Korean division and for subsequent requirements such as rotation and replacement of personnel and supplies.
- 8. Provision of financial support to Korean units and individuals in Vietnam, including combat duty pay at the same rate as paid to U.S. personnel, gratuities and compensations for line-of-duty deaths or disability, and salaries of Vietnamese indigenous personnel hired by Korean units.
- 9. Provision of four C-123 aircraft for medical evacuation and liaison between Korea and Vietnam.
- 10. Provision of a field broadcasting installation to enable the Korean division to conduct anti-Communist broadcasts, psychological warfare, and jamming operations and to provide Korean home news, war news, and entertainment programs.
Some years later, in January 1971, General Dwight E. Beach, who had succeeded General Howze as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on 1 July 1965, commented on the list.
The initial Korean bill (wish-list) was fantastic. Basically, the ROK wanted their troops to receive the same pay as the Americans, all new U.S. equipment for deploying troops and modernization of the entire ROK Army, Navy and Air Force. I told them with the Ambassador's concurrence that their bill was completely unreasonable and there was no change whatever of the U.S. agreeing to it. The final compromise included a very substantial increase in pay for the troops deployed, as much good equipment as we could then furnish and a U.S. commitment that no U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Korea without prior consultation with the ROK. The latter, to the Koreans, meant that no U.S. troops would be withdrawn without ROK approval. Obviously, the latter was not the case as is now evident with the withdrawal of the 7th U.S. Division from Korea.
The U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense ultimately resolved the matter of the Korean requirements.
