The request that three combat-ready reserve divisions be equipped to 100 percent of their authorized table of organization and equipment was, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea stated, heavily dependent upon the availability of Military Assistance Program funds. The dispatch of the Korean division to Vietnam might affect Military Assistance Program funds, but whether adversely or not could not be predicted. Under consideration was the possibility of using Korean Military Assistance Program funds to finance the readying and dispatch of the division and for the division's support while it was in Vietnam. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac areas, and other routine requirements was dependent upon information from the Commander in Chief, Pacific. The requirement to provide men for a small planning group to determine the organization of the Korean division met with immediate approval.
The request for signal equipment for direct communication between Korea and the Korean division in Vietnam was not approved. Although high-frequency radio equipment was available, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, General Beach, felt that a better solution was for the Koreans to use the current U.S. communication system on a common-user basis. The commander agreed that the United States should provide transportation for the division but, depending upon the availability of U.S. shipping, certain Korean vessels might have to be used.
The request for financial support to Korean units and individuals in Vietnam met with disapproval. The U.S. commander in Korea did not favor combat duty pay—especially at the same rate paid to U.S. troops—but was in agreement with the payment of an overseas allowance. If the United States had to pay death benefits or make disability payments, the rates should be those presently established under Korean law on a one-time basis only. The United States would not pay directly for the employment of Vietnamese nationals by Korean forces but was in favor of including such expenses in the agreements between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam. Since the request for four C-123 aircraft appeared to overlap a previous transportation request, the commander felt that the United States should provide only scheduled flights to Korea or reserve spaces on other U.S. scheduled flights for Korean use.
At first glance, the request for a field broadcasting installation appeared to conflict with the psychological warfare programs already in operation in Vietnam, but final resolution of the matter would have to await an on-the-ground opinion.
On 13 July 1965 the U.S. State Department authorized the
