other critical feature of their operation is the availability of reaction forces. The enemy soon knows when such a cordon is put around him. If he cannot exfiltrate by individuals or in small numbers, he may attempt to mass his forces and break out at one point. Against such contingencies the ROK's utilize several reaction forces to reinforce critical areas. They have found that the enemy may make one or even several feints at various points around the cordon prior to making the main effort to breach the encirclement. Hence, the ROK deployment of reaction forces is by small incremental elements until such time as the main effort is located, and then the action becomes rapid and positive. Through the use of these tactics, the ROK's have developed the cordon and search operation to a fine state of art. The ratio of enemy to friendly casualties has been phenomenal—on one occasion in excess of 100 to 1.
Generally Korean large-scale operations during 1969 were of regimental size or less, of brief duration, and with a specific target. One significant operation of this kind was DONG BO 7, carried out near Cam Ranh from 9 to 11 May 1969. Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 30th Regiment, 9th (White Horse) Division were airlifted onto Tao Mountain, a base for units of the 5th North Vietnam Army Division, and searched the caves and trenches on the mountain. When the operation ended, 155 enemy soldiers had been killed while the Koreans had three killed and one wounded.
Throughout 1970 the Koreans continued to conduct many operations of short duration aimed at supporting the over-all pacification program and the general campaign goals. The Korean Army division conducted an average of 150 small unit actions each day, including ambushes, search and clear operations, and the normal efforts to secure the areas around minor installations. The major results of Korean efforts were reflected in the infrequent larger scale operations of the Koreans; however, their kill ratio remained high for all operations.
Every time the Koreans performed a mission they did it well. A study of the tactical area of responsibility assigned them shows clearly that they were stretched to the limit geographically, with the job of keeping the roads open from above Phu Cat north of Qui Nhon all the way to Phan Rang down in Ninh Thuan, three provinces below Binh Dinh. They had several hundred road miles of responsibility—and they kept the roads open.
The enemy feared the Koreans both for their tactical innovations and for the soldiers' tenacity. It is of more than passing interest to note that there never was an American unit in Vietnam which was able to "smell out" small arms like the Koreans. The Koreans might not suffer many casualties, might not get too
