many of the enemy on an operation, but when they brought in seventy-five or a hundred weapons, the Americans wondered where in the world they got them. They appeared to have a natural nose for picking up enemy weapons that were, as far as the enemy thought, securely cached away. Considered opinion was that it was good the Koreans were "friendlies."
Evaluation of Korean Operations
Evaluation by senior U.S. officers of Korean operations during the period of the Koreans' employment in Vietnam tended to become more critical the longer the Koreans remained in Vietnam. Of several factors contributing to this trend, three were more significant than the others. First, the U.S. commanders expected more of the Koreans as they gained experience and familiarity with the terrain and the enemy. Second, the Koreans persisted in planning each operation "by the numbers," even though it would appear that previous experience would have eliminated a great deal of time and effort. Third, as time went on the Korean soldiers sent to Vietnam were of lower quality than the "cream of the crop" level of the entire Korean Army which first arrived.
General Larsen's successor as Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, General William B. Rosson, in his "End of Tour Debriefing Report" presented a number of insights into the problems of establishing effective teamwork between Korean and U.S. and Korean and Vietnam forces. General Rosson stressed the "extraordinary combination of ROK aspirations, attitudes, training, political sensitivities and national pride" which culminated in the Korean characteristics of restraint and inflexibility that many U.S. officers found so difficult to comprehend and to deal with. Rosson's experience led him to enjoy "studied flattery," which he used liberally and with success in establishing productive rapport, "but never to the point of meting out undeserved praise."
In addition General Rosson found certain other techniques in dealing with the Korean authorities: occasional calls on Korean officials junior to himself; encouragement of staff level visits between U.S. and Korean unit headquarters; combined U.S.-Korean conferences on a no-commitment basis to consider subjects of common interest; planning and conduct of combined operations; fulfillment of Korean requests for support whenever possible; visits to Korean units during combat operations; personal, face-to-face requests for assistance from the Koreans.
One of these techniques—fulfillment of Korean requests
