even a reference to the Mikado at Kyoto.[1] The epochal edicts of exclusion and seclusion of 1624, 1636, and 1638, were issued without any reference to the throne; and the later laws governing foreign intercourse, such as the edicts of 1825, 1842, and 1843, were promulgated in the same manner.[2] In this respect the foreigners were right when they believed that the Mikado had relinquished his temporal powers.
It was the Shogunate itself which raised the question of the reserved powers of the Mikado. Unwilling to accept the responsibility for altering the foreign policy of the empire, as proposed by Commodore Perry at his first visit in 1853, it referred the question to the throne and to the feudal lords. The imperial court at Kyoto and a majority of the daimyos (feudal lords) favored the maintenance of the exclusion laws, and the former sent down instructions to the Shogun at Yedo to drive the foreigners away.[3] Some defensive measures were taken, but eventually the Shogunate determined to grant the requests of the Americans, and the treaty of March 31, 1854, was signed. In this, and some of the contemporary treaties, the Tycoon (Shogun) is spoken of as the Emperor of Japan. The Perry treaty, and the British and Russian compacts which soon followed, were reported to the Mikado and his approval was granted in February, 1855.[4] Thus the weakness of the Shogunate had established two precedents, that treaties must be referred to the Mikado and approved by him, and that the daimyos might claim the right to be consulted about foreign affairs.
During the next few years the smouldering opposition to the Shogunate steadily increased, and its enemies made much of the weakness manifested in the reversal of the wise exclusion policy of the early Tokugawa.[5] Within the Shogun's castle there were divided counsels, a small minority of enlightened officials using all their influence in favor of the maintenance of the new foreign relations. So when Townsend Harris, the first American consul-general, sought to secure a treaty of commerce in place of the earlier treaty of peace and friendship, the liberal leaders had to face a growing opposition. Fortunately Harris conducted himself so well during his fifteen
- ↑ Gubbins, Progress of Japan, 1853–1871, pp. 71, 269; Satoh, Agitated Japan: the Life of Baron Ii Kamon-no-Kami Naosuke, p. 5; Akimoto, Lord Ii Naosuke and New Japan, p. 113.
- ↑ Parl. Papers, 1866, LXXVI. [3615], p. 4; Senate Ex. Doc. 59, p. 79, 32 Cong., 1 sess., serial 620.
- ↑ Gubbins, Progress of Japan, p. 92.
- ↑ Ibid., p. 100.
- ↑ The gradual weakening of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the preceding century cannot be considered here. The process was accelerated with the coming of Commodore Perry and the problems then presented.
