months' residence at Shimoda that he won the confidence of the Japanese. That moral victory gained, it was possible for him to secure an audience of the Shogun, and later to convince the enlightened prime minister, Lord Hotta Bitchiu-no-Kami, that Japan's best interests lay in enlarged intercourse with all the great powers.[1] With the negotiation of this master-treaty we are not concerned. But when it was almost agreed upon the Japanese commissioners stated that such was the opposition in the Castle that the treaty would have to be referred to the "Spiritual Emperor" at Kyoto for his approval, and "that the moment that approval was received, the daimyos must withdraw their opposition". Harris very naturally inquired what would happen if the Mikado refused his assent and was told "in a prompt and decided manner, that the government had determined not to receive any objections from the Mikado". If this was the case, he then asked, what was the use in delaying the negotiations "for what appears to be a mere ceremony", and he was told "that it was this solemn ceremony that gave value to it".[2] He proposed, therefore, that they complete their work, but postpone signing the treaty until the end of sixty days. This was agreed to, the draft was completed on February 26, 1858, and Harris looked forward to April 21 when it would be signed.
The positive assurance of the Japanese commissioners was justified by all the previous relations between the Shogunate and the imperial court. Never had a request for the formal approval of an act been denied. So two minor officials were sent up to Kyoto to secure the imperial sanction for the treaty, Hayashi Daigaku-no-Kami, who had been one of the signatories of the Perry treaty, and Tsuda Hanzaburo. Hayashi presented to the imperial court a letter from Hotta, the prime minister, but the opponents of the Shogunate saw in the low rank of Hayashi and Tsuda a chance to make trouble and crying out that their presence was an insult to the throne they prevented a favorable reply.[3] This was the first rebuff of the Shogunate.
Lord Hotta, alarmed at the evidence of open hostility in Kyoto, then went up himself to reason with the court. The address which he presented was a remarkable document, the work of a forward-looking statesman, amazingly modern in its point of view for that period.[4] It pointed out the changed conditions in international
