Whatever Definition we may give of Liberty, we should be careful to observe two requisite Circumstances; first, that it be consistent with plain Matter of Fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these Circumstances, and render our Definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all Mankind will be found of one Opinion with regard to it.
'Tis universally allow'd, that nothing exists without a Cause of its Existence, and that Chance, when strictly examin'd, is a mere negative Word, and means not any real Power, which has, any where, a Being in Nature. But 'tis pretended that some Causes are necessary, and some are not necessary. Here then is the admirable Advantage of Definitions. Let any one define a Cause, without comprehending, as a Part of the Definition, a necessary Connexion with its Effect; and let him shew distinctly the Origin of the Idea, express'd by the Definition; and I shall frankly give up the whole Controversy. But if the foregoing Explication of the Matter be receiv'd, this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not Objects a regular and constant Conjunction with each other, we should never have entertain'd any Notion of Cause and Effect; and this constant Conjunction produces that Inference of the Understanding, which is the only Connexion, that we can have any Comprehension of. Whoeverattempts
