Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/164

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152
ESSAY VIII.

attempts a Definition of Cause, exclusive of these Circumstances, will be oblig'd, either to employ unintelligible Terms, or such as are synonimous to the Term which he endeavours to define[1]. And if the Definition above mentioned, be admitted; Liberty, when oppos'd to Necessity, not to Constraint, is the same Thing with Chance; which is universally allow'd to have no Existence.

PART II.

There is no Method of Reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than in philosophical Debates, to endeavour the Refutation of any Hypothesis, by a Pretext of its dangerous Consequences to Religion and Morality. When any Opinion leads into Absurdities, 'tis certainly false; but 'tis not certain an Opinion is false, because 'tis of dangerous Consequence. Such Topics, therefore, ought entirely tobe

  1. Thus if a Cause be defin'd, that which produces any thing; 'tis easy to observe, that producing is synonimous to causing. In like manner, if a Cause be defin'd, that by which any thing exists; this is liable to the same Objection. For what is meant by these Words, by which? Had it been said, that a Cause is that after which any thing constantly exists; we should have understood the Terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the Matter. And this Constancy forms the very Essence of Necessity, nor have we any other Idea of it.