Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/107

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Why Utility pleases.
93

sure[1]. What Wonder, then, if we can pronounce no Sentence concerning the Characters and Conduct of Men without considering the Tendencies of their Actions, and the Happiness or Misery, which thence arises to Society? What Association of Ideas would ever operate, were that Principle here totally inactive[2]?

  1. Decentior equus cujus astricta sunt ilia; sed idem velocior. Pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos execitatio expressit; idem certamini paratior. Nunquam enim species ab utilitate dividitur. Sed hoc quidem discernere modici judicii est." Quintilian, Inst. lib. 8. cap. 3.
  2. In proportion to the Station which a Man possesses, according to the Relations in which he is plac'd; we always expect from him a greater or less Degree of Good, and when disappointed, blame his Inutility; and much more, do we blame him, if any Ill or Prejudice arise from his Conduct and Behaviour. When the Interests of one Country interfere with those of another, we estimate the Merits of a Statesman by the Good or Ill, which results to his own Country from his Measures and Councils, without Regard to the Prejudice which he brings on its Enemies and Rivals. His Fellow-citizens are the Objects, which lie nearest the Eye, while we determine his Character. And as Nature has implanted in every one a superior Affection to his own Country, we never expect any Regard to distant Nations, where the smallest Competition arises. Not to mention, that while every Man consults the Good of his own Community, we are sensible, that the general Interest of Mankind is better promoted, than any loose indeterminate Views to the Good of a Species, whence no beneficial Action could ever result, for want of a duly limited Object, on which they could exert themselves.

If