Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/108

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94
SECTION V.

If any Man, from a cold Insensibility, or narrow Selfishness of Temper, is unaffected with the Images of human Happiness or Misery, he must be equally indifferent to the Images of Vice and Virtue: As on the other Hand, 'tis always found, that a warm Concern for the Interests of our Species is attended with a delicate Feeling of all moral Distinctions; a strong Resentment of Injury done to Men; a lively Approbation of their Welfare. In this Particular, tho' great Superiority is observable of one Man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the Interest of their Fellow-creatures, as to perceive no Distinctions of moral Good and Evil, in consequence of the different Tendencies of Actions and Principles. How, indeed, can we suppose it possible of any one, who wears a human Heart, that, if there be subjected to his Censure, one Character or System of Conduct, which is beneficial, and another, which is pernicious, to his Species or Community, he will not so much as give a cool Preference to the former, or ascribe to it the smallest Merit or Regard? Let us suppose such a Person ever so selfish; let private Interest have ingrost ever so much his Attention; yet in Instances, where that is not concern'd, he must unavoidably feel some Propensity to the Good of Mankind, and make it an Object of Choice, if every Thing else be equal.Would