Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/110

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96
SECTION V.

order order and Misery in Society, must, for the same Reason, be regarded with Pleasure and Complacency. Timon, who probably from his affected Spleen, more than any inveterate Malice, was denominated the Man-hater, embrac'd Alcibiades, 'tis said, with great Fondness. Go on, my Boy! cries he, Acquire the Confidence of the People: You will one Day, I foresee, be the Cause of great Calamities to them[1]. Could we admit the two Principles of the Manichæans, 'tis an infallible Consequence, that their Sentiments of human Actions, as well as of every Thing else, must be totally opposite; and that every Instance of Justice and Humanity, from its necessary Tendency, must please the one Deity, and displease the other. All Mankind so far resemble the good Principle, that where Interest or Revenge or Envy perverts not our Disposition, we are always enclin'd, from our natural Philanthropy, to give the Preference to the Happiness of Society, and consequently to Virtue, above its opposite. Absolute, unprovok'd, disinterested Malice has never, perhaps, Place in any human Breast; or if it had, must there pervert all the Sentiments of Morals, as well as the Feelings of Humanity. If the Cruelty of Nero be allow'd altogether voluntary, and not rather the Effect of constant Fear and Resentment; 'tis evident, that Tigellinus,

  1. Plutarch in vita Alc.

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