Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/122

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
108
SECTION VI.

'Tis hard to tell, whether you hurt a Man's Character most by calling him a Knave or a Coward, and whether a beastly Glutton or Drunkard be not as odious and contemptible as a selfish, ungenerous Miser. Give me my Choice; and I would rather, for my own Happiness and Self-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane Heart than possess all the other Virtues of Demosthenes and Philip united: But I would rather pass with the World for one endow'd with extensive Genius and intrepid Courage, and should thence expect stronger Instances of general Applause and Admiration. The Figure a Man makes in Life, the Reception he meets with in Company, the Esteem paid him by his Acquaintance; all these Advantages depend as much upon his good Sense and Judgment as upon any other Part of his Character. Had a Man the best Intentions in the World, and were the farthest remov'd from all Injustice and Violence, he would never be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate Share, at least, of Parts and Understanding.

What is it then we can here dispute about? If Sense and Courage, Temperance and Industry, Wit and Knowledge confessedly form a considerable Part of personal Merit; if a Man possest of them is both better satisfy'd with himself, and better entitledto