to the Good-will, Esteem, and Services of others, than one entirely devoid of them; if, in short, the Sentiments be similar, that arise from these Endowments and from the social Virtues; is there any Reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a Word, or doubting whether they are entitled to the Denomination of Virtue[1]? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the Sentiment of Approbation, which those Accomplishments produce, besides its being inferior, is also somewhat different from that, which attends the Virtues of Justice and Humanity. But this seems not a sufficient Reason for ranking them entirely under different Classes and Appellations. The Character of Cæsar and that of Cato, as drawn by Salust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest Sense of the Word; but in a different Way: Nor are the Sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces Love; the other,
- ↑ It seems to me, that in our Language, Courage, Temperance, Industry, Frugality, &c. according to popular Stile, are call'd Virtues; but when a Man is said to be virtuous, or is denominated a Man of Virtue, we chiefly regard his social Qualities. 'Tis needless for a moral, philosophical Discourse to enter into all these Caprices of Language, which are so variable in different Dialects, and in different Ages of the same Dialect. The Sentiments of Men, being more uniform, as well as more important, are a fitter Subject of Speculation: Tho' at the same Time, we just observe, that whatever the social Virtues are talk'd of, 'tis plainly imploy'd, by this Distinction, that there are also, other Virtues of a different Nature.
Esteem:
