Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/36

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SECTION II.

some vindictive Animals, infuse our very Souls into the Wounds we give an Enemy[1]? And what a malignant Philosophy must it be, that will not allow, to Humanity and Friendship, the same Privileges, which are indisputably granted to the darker Passions of Enmity and Resentment? Such a Philosophy is more like a Satyr, than a true Delineation or Description, of human Nature; and may be a good Foundation for paradoxical Wit and Raillery, but is a very bad one for any serious Argument or Reasoning.

PART II.

It may be esteem'd, perhaps, a superfluous Task to prove, that the benevolent or softer Affections are VIRTUOUS; and wherever they appear, attract the Esteem, Approbation, and Good-will of Mankind. The Epithets sociable, good-natur'd, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, are known in all Languages, and universally express the highest Merit, which human Nature is capable of attaining: Where these amiable Qualities are attended with Birth and Power and eminent Abilities, and display themselves in the good Government or

  1. Animasque in vulnere ponunt. Virg.
    Dum alteri noceat, sui negligens, says Seneca of Anger. De Ira. L. I.

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