Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/91

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Why Utility pleases.
77

taphysics, we could as easily get rid of the Cavils of that Sect, as in the more practical and intelligible Sciences of Politics and Morals.

The social Virtues must, therefore, be allow'd to have a natural Beauty and Amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all Precept or Education, recommends them to the Esteem of uninstructed Mankind, and engages their Affections. And as the Utility of these Virtues is the chief Circumstance, whence they derive their Merit, it follows, that the End, which they have a Tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural Affection. It must please, either from Considerations of Self-interest, or from more generous Motives and Regards.

It has often been asserted, that, as every Man has a strong Connexion with Society, and perceives the Impossibility of his solitary Subsistence, he becomes, on that Account, favourable to all those Habits or Principles, which promote Order in Society, and ensure to him the quiet Possession of so inestimable a Blessing. As much as we value our own Happiness and Welfare, as much must we value the Practice of Justice and Humanity, by which alone the social Confederacy can be maintain'd, and every Man reap the Fruits of mutual Protection and Assistance.

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