Page:An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding - Locke (1690).djvu/40

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24
No innate practical Principles
Book I.

ally to know, and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come under these two general words made use of above, viz. Virtutes & Peccata, Vertues and Sins, there will be more reason for admitting these, and the like, for common Notions, and practical Principles: yet after all, universal Consent (were there any in Moral Principles) to Truths, the knowledge whereof might be attained otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.

§. 20. Nor will it be of much moment here, to offer that very ready, but not very material Answer, (viz.) That the innate Principles of Morality, may, by Education, and Custom, and the general Opinion of those amongst whom we converse, be darkened, and at last quite worn out of the Minds of Men. Which assertion of theirs, if true quite takes away the Argument of universal Consent, by which this Opi••on of innate Principles is endeavoured to be proved: unless those men will think it reasonable, that their own private Perswasions, or that of their Party, should pass for universal Consent; a thing not unfrequently done, when men presuming themselves to be the only Masters of right Reason, cast by the Votes and Opinions of the rest of Mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their Argument stands thus: The Principles which all mankind allow for true, are innate; those that men of right Reason admit, are the Principles allowed by all mankind; we and those of our mind, are men of right Reason; therefore we agreeing, our Principles are innate; which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to Infallibility. For otherwise it will be very hard to understand, how there be some Principles which all men do acknowledge, and agree in; and yet there are none of those Principles which are not by depraved Custom and ill Education blotted out of the minds of many men: Which is to say, That all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and dissent from them. And indeed the supposition of such first Principles, will serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss with, as without them, if they may by any humane Power, such as is the Will of our Teachers, or Opinions of our Companions, be altered or lost in us; and notwithstanding all this boast of first Principles, and innate Light, we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty, as if there were no such thing at all. It being all one to have no Rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongst various and contrary Rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning innate Principles, I desire these men to say, whether they can, or cannot, by Education and Custom, be blurr'd and blotted out: If they cannot, we must find them in all Mankind alike, and they must be clear in every body: And if they may suffer variation from adventitious Notions, we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous, nearest the Fountain in Children and illiterate People, who have received least impression from foreign Opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact, and daily observation.

§. 21. I easily grant, that there are great numbers of Opinions, which, by men of different Countries, Educations, and Tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable Principles; many whereof, both for their absurdity, as well as oppositions one to another, it is impossible should be true. But yet all those Propositions, how remote soever from Reason, are so sacred somewhere or other, that Men, even of good Understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their Lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.

§. 22.