Opinion of the Court
could have designed a scheme that allowed adjudicators to maximize fairness in every case. But Congress has the power to choose between rules, which prioritize efficiency and predictability, and standards, which prioritize optimal results in individual cases. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352–353 (observing that “Congress decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases … in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system”). Congress opted for rules in this statutory scheme, and an equitable extension of §5110(b)(1)’s 1-year grace period would disrupt that choice.
B
Arellano contests all of this. Laser focused on §5110(b)(1), he argues that the provision’s unadorned text contains none of the specific, technical language that might otherwise rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. In addition, he emphasizes that there are “zero express exceptions to §5110(b)(1)’s one-year clock,” which he describes as “fatal” to the Secretary’s position. Reply Brief 14. As Arellano sees it, §5110(b)(1) is a simple time limit and therefore a classic case for equitable tolling.
If §5110(b)(1) stood alone, there might be something to Arellano’s argument. (Again, assuming that §5110(b)(1) is a limitations period to which the Irwin presumption applies.) But §5110(b)(1) cannot be understood independently of §5110(a)(1), which makes the date of receipt the effective date “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter.” Arellano insists that the Secretary overreads “unless” by treating it as a signal that the enacted exceptions are exclusive. Brief for Petitioner 31–32. But the clause says more than “unless”—it says that the default applies “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise.” §5110(a)(1) (emphasis added). That is an instruction to attend to specifically enacted language to the exclusion of general, unenacted carveouts. While Arellano claims to seek an equitable
