Opinion of the Court
exception to a general rule, he actually seeks an equitable exception to an exception to a general rule. Structurally, that is a heavy lift. Moreover, §5110(b)(1) is nestled within a list of 15 other exceptions to §5110(a)(1)’s default rule, and, as we have already explained, the presence of this detailed, lengthy list raises the inference that the enumerated exceptions are exclusive.
Arellano also resists the proposition that the express accounting for disability-caused delay in §5110(b)(4) hurts his case. On the contrary, he insists that it works in his favor. Citing Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43 (2002), he maintains that an express tolling provision does not displace the presumption of tolling but rather demonstrates that a statute incorporates traditional equitable principles. Brief for Petitioner 37–38. According to Arellano, Congress’s silence in §5110(b)(1) merely shows that it wanted those traditional principles to apply at full strength. Ibid.; Reply Brief 19–20.
We disagree. Section 5110(b)(4) does not help Arellano; for the reasons we have already explained, it illustrates why equitably tolling §5110(b)(1) is incongruent with the statutory scheme. Young is inapposite. There, we concluded that an “express tolling provision” for a time limit in a bankruptcy statute supported equitable tolling of a different time limit in the same statute. 535 U. S., at 53. But that was largely because the express tolling provision authorized tolling where equity would not otherwise have permitted it. Ibid. As a result, we interpreted the express tolling provision to “supplemen[t] rather than displac[e] principles of equitable tolling.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Here, however, §5110(b)(4) does not authorize tolling that equity would not otherwise have allowed. If anything, its conditional and narrow applicability limits tolling that might otherwise have occurred. Though Arellano makes a valiant effort to turn a negative into a positive, §5110(b)(4) remains an obstacle to his interpretation.
