of tangible as well as sapid qualities; and Touch is ex-
tended over the body. Some properties, however, which
are enumerated, are subject to all the senses, and, hence,
termed common; but the attempted illustration of them
by "a kind of motion" (κίνησις τις) does not, owing to its
vagueness, assist in explaining them.
Note 2, p. 91. An object is said to be perceived, &c.]
An example in illustration of casual or accidental percep-
tion; but it is by its wording so obscure as to stand itself
in need of elucidation. The purport, however, seems to be,
that the percipient does not, by sight, (as sight distinguishes
only colour and form) discern what the white object really
is; but the other senses, by some accidental perception,
coming in aid of the special sense, may determine that
the white object is a certain individual. There may
besides, perhaps, be a covert allusion to the two-fold
acceptation of the term accident, which signified then
as it does now both casual incidents and the real, or
inalienable properties of bodies; and if so, the passage
may imply that the individual is perceived by chance;
detected, that is, by a mere guess. It is of little moment,
but the individual alluded to is said, by Philoponus, to
have been a friend of Aristotle's; and that letters which
had passed between them were extant in his time.
