whereabouts, while perhaps not entirely false, was plainly less than forthright and inconsistent with Huffman's duty of candor.
DHS's argument on appeal—that the circuit judge's oral statements from the bench (to the effect that DHS is required to present all material evidence in dependency-neglect proceedings, even evidence inconsistent with its position) constitute an impermissible "local rule"—is unavailing. First, it is not clear from the limited record before this court that DHS raised this argument to the circuit court at any time. Second, the circuit court's written order did not rely on any such proposition, and our decision to affirm the circuit court's written order is not a comment on any such proposition. Third, even if the circuit court had relied on this proposition in its ruling, we would still affirm its decision because its ultimate conclusion is nonetheless correct. See Alexander v. Chapman, 299 Ark. 126, 130, 771 S.W.2d 744, 746–47 (1989) ("We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is correct for any reason.").
In short, regardless of whether it was problematic that Huffman and DHS declined to present all evidence inconsistent with DHS’s position (such as Eneks's testimony), it was certainly problematic that Huffman, undisputedly, took an affirmative step (directing Eneks to leave) to prevent the other parties and the court from presenting or considering such evidence. This action, which occurred directly in front of the circuit judge, was plainly indicative of prior coordination, and the circuit judge reasonably inferred as much. This all tended to disrupt the circuit court's proceedings and to impair the respect due to the circuit court's authority, and the circuit court's decision as to Huffman is affirmed.
11
