III. Analysis
With regard to both Huffman and Eneks, the circuit court's punishment consisted of an unconditional penalty (eight hours of community service and a one-page paper). The law treats this as "criminal" contempt; accordingly, this case requires no assessment of whether Huffman or Eneks has since "purged" his or her contempt. Furthermore, with regard to both Huffman and Eneks, the conduct in question occurred in the presence of the circuit judge. The law treats this as "direct" contempt; accordingly, the circuit court's decision is not subject to the restrictions outlined in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108(a), and the circuit court was within its power to punish the alleged contempt summarily. Burradell, supra. Accordingly, the only question remaining before this court is whether the circuit court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. McCullough, supra.
As to Huffman, the circuit court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. Huffman, an attorney, is an officer of the court, and he owed the court a duty of candor. He knew the subject matter that would be litigated at the change-of-custody hearing, and he knew Eneks's testimony would be highly relevant to that proceeding. It matters not that DHS had designated another individual as its representative for the hearing in question, or that Eneks was not under subpoena that day. There is no requirement that one subpoena an individual to court before one is allowed to call that individual as a witness in a given proceeding, and Eneks had been in court all day testifying in other dependency-neglect proceedings until Huffman directed her to leave. Huffman's equivocal response—"I don't know"—to the circuit court's inquiry as to Eneks's
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