which a conviction may be had on such an indictment shall, in forming its sentence, take into consideration the punishment previously inflicted.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108 (Repl. 2010).
B. Direct and Indirect Contempt
Both the Arkansas Constitution and the governing state statute distinguish between direct and indirect contempt. See Ark. Const. art. 7, § 26 ("The General Assembly shall have power to regulate the punishment of contempts not committed in the presence or hearing of the courts, or in disobedience of process."); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108; see also Allison v. DuFresne, 340 Ark. 583, 12 S.W.3d 216 (2000); Davis v. Merritt, 252 Ark. 659, 480 S.W.2d 924 (1972). Direct contempt is a contemptuous act "committed within the immediate presence of the Court." Merritt, 252 Ark. at 670, 480 S.W.2d at 930. Indirect contempt is contemptuous behavior committed outside the presence of the judge. An obvious example of direct contempt, apart from open misconduct in the courtroom, is when a party comes to court drunk. See Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931 S.W.2d 100 (1996).
A court has inherent power to punish contemptuous behavior committed in its presence, without regard to the restrictions imposed by § 16-10-108(a). Id. at 185, 931 S.W.2d at 102. Summary punishment for contempt committed in the presence of the court is an inherent power reserved to the judiciary and cannot be abridged by legislation. Id.; see also Hodges v. Gray, 321 Ark. 7, 901 S.W.2d 1 (1995). Furthermore, the appropriateness of a contempt finding does not turn on whether the contemnor subjectively intended to engage in conduct that would be considered contemptuous. Burradell, 326 Ark. at 186, 931 S.W.2d at 103.
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