what popular Christianity as well as the Semitic systems, Judaism and Islam, have done. In all these systems God is conceived as without form. But these conceptions are clearly due to a confused understanding of what ‘form’ really means and implies. The central idea of form is that which separates one object from another. In our ordinary sense-experience the dividing line between one thing and another is material. Therefore, we naturally rush to the conclusion that form must necessarily be something material, cogni- sable by our eyes or the other senses. But that this is not the essential connotation of the term form is even admitted by the crowd who speak of thought-form. Thought-forms, organised in words, in literature, are not ad- mittedly material forms. The real concept of form, therefore, is something that separates or differentiates one object from another. And the question is, must this ‘something’ neces- sarily be something material or realised by outer senses? The logic of all worship leads irresistibly to the existence of ‘form’ as the essential element of differentiation between the worshipper and the Object of his worship; and that by which the worshipper realises himself as the worshipper and his Deity as the
