and after all, we can scarcely be said to be paying more than a fair price for the neglect with which, for twenty years, we have regarded the Russian encroachments, and for the consummate folly which induced the Gladstone Government, in a fit of pique with the policy of its predecessors, to abandon the position which we held at Kandahar at the close of the last Afghan war. It is to the abandonment of Kandahar that the whole of the present difficulty is directly due; for it was not until it was positively announced that we were to "scuttle" out of Afghanistan that the Russians began to press in the direction of Merv and Sarakhs. Had a British garrison been in Kandahar at the present moment, we would have had no more anxiety about Herat than we have about Peshawur.
It is evident that Mr Gladstone's Government has again entered upon a course of timorous diplomacy, from which it is most unlikely to extract an effective remedy for the present difficulty, and out of which it is absolutely certain to come second best. A diplomatic duel in which Lord Granville is pitted against M. de Giers, must be a spectacle as ridiculous to the rest of Europe as it is painful to ourselves. Already, in what little of the negotiations have been allowed to transpire, we have not figured to advantage. While Lord Granville is fidgeting, and sending special messages to St Petersburg to make sure that Mr Gladstone was correct in his explanation of the "arrangement" which is to last "as long as there is occasion for it," and which, it is presumed, will keep the Russians from advancing farther while efforts to settle the dispute are pending, Russia is calling councils of her generals, M. de Giers is bustling between the Chancellery and Gatschina, troops are being hurried across the Caspian to the scene of dispute, all the Russian stations in Turkistan are in a bustle of preparation; and probably we shall speedily hear of strong forces massing at Charjui and Kilif, the two points on the Oxus from which, as bases, Russia can most effectively operate. Whatever may be the upshot of the discussions between the British and Russian Governments, we can clearly see that Russia's position will be greatly improved by delay, by which she assuredly will not fail to profit. In fact, if we look frankly at the situation, both Herat and our expedition may, without exaggeration, be said to lie at her mercy. According to the most recent accounts, Russia has 4000 men in and about the Murghab Valley, and as many more on the Heri-Rud; while the British expedition numbers only 400, exclusive of the officers of the Commission. Of the Afghan strength we have no accurate information, but it must have been largely increased within a very recent date if it is able to cope with the Russian force with which it is now confronted. And we must remember that every week of delay will add to the Russian strength. She could without difficulty spare 70,000 men from the army of the Caucasus; she could draw half as many more from Turkestan; and we have no means of estimating the hordes of Turkoman levies she could at once throw upon Afghanistan. It will be seen, then, that the position about Herat is a precarious one, especially since it depends upon nothing more stable than Mr Gladstone's "arrangement," which chance or intention may at any moment dissolve in open hostilities.
Nor is Herat the only point from
