which Russia is effectively able to menace the integrity of Afghanistan and disturb our position in India. Suppose, in case of a rupture, Russia lays siege to Herat, she can still draw sufficient forces from Tashkend, and other garrisons in the khanates, to overrun the Afghan territory of Balkh, which is probably not less an object of her ambition than the possession of Herat itself. Indeed it might not be a very extravagant speculation to suppose that Balkh, with the Paropamisus range for a frontier, is the "golden bridge" of which broad hints are now being dropped. But neither by the Ameer nor by the British could such a proposal for one minute be tolerated. Russia in Balkh would be even more dangerous to us than Russia at Herat. As it is, if we are involved in hostilities, the chances of a Russian invasion of Balkh must greatly increase our responsibility and danger. Because the tide of the invasion of India from Central Asia has always, with the exception of Baber's invasion, rolled past Herat, we have been too apt to assume that there is no other channel through which it can flow except the traditional one. Sir Henry Norman, one of the stanchest supporters of Lord Lawrence's "masterly inactivity" policy, admits that "if Russia really intends to injure us in India, which of course would involve war in Europe, my impression is, that she is at least as likely to make an advance from the direction of Tashkend towards Afghan-Turkistan and Cabul, as to move forward by Herat." The whole distance from Tashkend to Cabul is only 841 miles. The road is good, with the exception of 150 miles of sandy desert between Karshi and the Oxus, and the passes of the Hindoo Kush, which are difficult, and which would supply the Afghans with means of offering serious resistance to an invading force. At all events, by throwing troops from Tashkend into Balkh – and it is agreed that for this object from 25,000 to 30,000 men and 30 guns are available, to say nothing of levies of irregulars – Russia could divide the attention of the British and the Afghans, and compel them to assume a defensive attitude at Cabul as well as at Herat. Nor is this all. From Balkh, Russia can command the passes leading to India by Chitral, Kashmir, and Ladakh, and compel us to concentrate a considerable part of our attention upon the direct defence of our own frontier. These routes, no doubt, are difficult, are even probably impracticable for a siege-train; but nevertheless, it is not beyond the vigour and audacity of Russia to attempt them. Nor can we afford to overlook even the remotest possibility of her gaining a footing on the flank of the Punjab. We shall therefore be compelled to guard the safety of the northern frontier of India, as well as do battle for the integrity of the Ameer's dominions, if unfortunately the negotiations now going on do not lead to a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.
The situation which now confronts us at present is all the more perplexing that it differs in many respects from the calculations which we have hitherto formed as to the way in which a collision between Britain and Russia would take place in the East. We have generally assumed that Afghanistan would fall under the influence of Russian intrigue, and that we would have the Ameer as well as the Czar for enemies. Our experience of Afghan politics has
