hitherto strongly favoured this view, which indeed was on the point of being realised had not the Treaty of San Stefano put an end to the efforts which Russian agents were making to excite the Ameer against the Indian Government, as well as to Russia's intention to strike at British power in the East in the event of our taking part with Turkey. But it can scarcely be said that we have calculated much on the probability of fighting side by side with the Ameer for the security of his dominions. The present situation has its advantages, but also its drawbacks. We have too good reason to know that the alliance of the Afghan people is not to be despised in the field even against a European foe; and it is a decided gain that we can look upon Afghanistan as a buffer, and not as a battering-ram to be driven against us. We see no reason to doubt the honesty of the Ameer on this occasion; and Abdulrahman must have had enough of experience of Russian rule in Asia during his years of exile to know what he and his subjects have to expect if they were to fall directly or indirectly under the dominion of the Czar. It is also no small matter that we shall carry with us in our defence of the Ameer's territories the sympathies of the Indian Mussulmans, whose minds are only too easily unsettled when we come into collision with any race of their co-religionists. In a paper prepared for Government by a distinguished general officer in 1878, when war with Russia seemed imminent, the following passage very justly expresses the effect which would be produced upon them: –
"In such a war as is here supposed, the Mohammedans of India and Afghanistan would believe only that we were fighting against the traditional enemy of their religion; and the measure promises such advantageous results for our dominion in India, that a patriotic Englishman might almost be pardoned for hoping that his country should be driven by inadmissible demands on the part of Russia to declare war."
But the interest that our Mohammedan subjects naturally take in the question at issue is a fact that the Government ought by no means to leave out of account in its endeavours to effect a peaceful accommodation. However much we may desire by concession to obviate the danger of kindling war both in Asia and in Europe, we must beware of sacrificing the interests of our ally to our desire for maintaining a good understanding with Russia. Such an error would not only, in all probability, alienate the Ameer, and ultimately throw him into the arms of Russia, but it would have the worst possible effect upon the feelings of the Indian Mussulmans, who are always jealously watching for any breach of faith towards Islam, as an excuse for giving expression to their natural antipathy for an infidel Government. Even peace might be purchased at too high a price if we shook the faith of the Afghans, and of their co-religionists in India, in our respect for our treaty obligations. It must be remembered, too, that in the course of these negotiations our Indian prestige will have to go through a very trying ordeal. Every concession, the slightest appearance of a surrender, will be regarded as wrung from us through a fear of encountering Russia in the field; and there probably never was a time when we stood more in need of all the advantages which our
