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authorized. The fuel on board the aircraft at the time it left Washington was sufficient for the flight to proceed to any of its alternates, and remain well within the requirements of the Civil Air Regulations.
The United States Weather Bureau and Eastern's forecasts proved to be accurate within reasonable limits. They predicted that high ceilings would prevail over the area to be traversed by the flight and that ground fog would be encountered along the eastern seaboard. An aftercast of the weather condition existing at the time of the accident showed light ground fog forming at the Savannah Airport at 9:58 p.m., gradually becoming dense ground fog and reducing the visibility to zero by 2:16 a.m. approximately six minutes after the accident. The wind remained calm with the exception of the 1:30 a.m. report, which was west 2 m.p.h., thus indicating that no large changes in air mass condition were occurring at the station during the night or early morning.
Captain Cann and First Officer Loveless agreed that the engines, propellers, airplane controls and radio equipment were functioning normally during the entire flight. Eastern's maintenance records indicated that the aircraft and all of its equipment had been maintained in an airworthy condition. Moreover, a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft performed prior to its departure from Washington showed that it was in a satisfactory condition. The report of the National Bureau of Standards indicates that neither the right tire nor the right wheel were defective. The monitoring reports of all the radio ranges along the course showed them to be operating accurately during the period involved.
Captain Cann’s action in descending to the 2000-foot level over the Charleston range station to "take a look" at the airport cannot be criticized in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. Upon approaching Charleston he heard part of the 1:30 a.m. sequence weather broadcast by the Charleston range station, which indicated that Charleston then had 1/2 mile visibility. The captain testified that due to the thickness of the fog he could not see the lights of the airport and therefore concluded that it would be unsafe to attempt a landing.
Although an error was made by the Civil Aeronautics communications operator at Savannah in transmitting via teletype the visibility as 1-1/8 miles rather than 1/8 mile in his regular 1:30 a.m. report, it is obvious that this mistake had no bearing on the accident. Corrective measures were taken by both him and the communications operator at Charleston immediately after it occurred. Moreover, Mr. Worthington, the Civil Aeronautics communications operator at Savannah, after notifying Eastern's Savannah station of the mistake, proceeded downstairs to Eastern's office and personally advised Mr. Davis, the transportation agent. The fact that he was requested to, and did make, another visibility observation at this time cannot be considered irregular under the circumstances. An observer of the United States Weather Bureau is authorized to take and record an observation upon request, and Mr. Worthington was entirely within his authorization in doing as he did. The only criticism that can be made was his omission in not making the observation a part of the official record.
After leaving Charleston and before arriving in the vicinity of Savannah, Captain Cann was fully advised as to the weather conditions existing at Savannah. Although Eastern's Jacksonville station had previously given him the erroneous visibility observation at Savannah of 1-1/8 miles, that station subsequently advised the flight at 1:41 a.m. that the visibility was 1/2 mile, variable. First Officer Loveless when questioned concerning the
