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1-1/8 mile visibility, stated that shortly after receiving the weather report he recognized the discrepancy. Since First Officer Loveless had recognized this error, and since Captain Cann had received the erroneous weather report, it is difficult to understand why they failed to request a verification of the report by Eastern's ground station at Jacksonville. It is a matter of common knowledge to airline pilots that the United States Weather Bureau reports visibility in 1/4-mile fractions when the visibility is about 1/4 mile and, when less than 1/4 mile it is reported as 1/8 mile or zero. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Captain Cann and First Officer Loveless knew or should have known that an error had been made. Since it appears that neither of them heard the correction by the communications operator at Charleston, and since neither of them requested a verification of the erroneous report, it is apparent that they accepted, without question, the 1/2 mile variable, visibility report.
As the flight approached Savannah, the Captain requested and was given the surface wind of 2 m.p.h., Kollsman 29 91, visibility 1/2 mile, variable, by the Eastern ground station. During this time Captain Cann and First Officer Loveless stated that they could see the beacon light and other lights on the ground, although the beacon "looked sort of fuzzy". It is probable that the captain could see the marker lights outlining the ends of the runway as he passed directly over the airport at an altitude of 1000 feet. Earle R Foote, the soldier on duty guarding the Army airplanes, testified that he saw the airplane come over at about that altitude traveling in a southwesterly direction. He stated, however, that he lost sight of the airplane as the fog obscured his view. Captain Cann stated that smoke, which was lying across the northeast end of the northeast-southwest runway, was the only obstruction to a normal landing condition. Both flight officers stated that they could see the lights of the airport during the 360-degree turn and final approach to the airport. It is significant to note that it was at this time that Davis called the flight and said that the "visibility is not as good as when I last called you".
Neither Davis nor Foote saw the airplane again until it appeared just over the end of the northeast runway. Davis said it was about 25 to 50 feet high, and making a normal approach. He watched the airplane until just before it contacted the ground in what appeared to be a normal landing, however, he said his attention was attracted to something inside the building and he did not see the airplane land. He testified that he heard the airplane contact the ground but the Army airplanes and the fog prevented him from seeing the accident. The airplane came to rest approximately 2000 feet to the west of the Administration Building where Davis was standing.
Foote, who was standing out near the runway in question, was in a much better position to see the airplane and observe its approach. He said it was flying "not so fast, but high", and that almost immediately it dropped suddenly to the ground from an altitude of about 30 feet, then bounced into the air and disappeared from view. He said it sounded "like the coupling of box cars and the scraping of metal". Foote’s testimony indicates that the disappearance of the airplane from his view was not the result of the upward bounce of the airplane but was due to the fact that it was traveling almost directly away from him. In other words, although fog subsequently obscured his view, this obscurity was because of the increasing distance between him and the aircraft rather than because of a greater density of fog at the height to which the aircraft bounced. Neither did Mr. Foote recall seeing any smoke, as described by Captain Cann and First Officer Loveless, lying or drifting across the runway. Although he had, from time to time, before the accident, been able to discern boundary lights on the southwest end of the field about 3000 feet distant, he could not see
