This page needs to be proofread.
C00036554
Ironically, the Allies knew through ULTRA that German troops remained in Norway and concluded on the basis of this feedback that the deception was successful.
As Lewin (52) noted:
| “ | On Sherlock Holmes' famous principle about the importance of the dog that did not bark in the
night, the significant fact for the deceivers in London was that no such major movement of troops from Norway was disclosed on Ultra up to and beyond the time of D-Day. Here was clinching evidence that the deception plans were working. |
” |
— evidence consistent with one hypothesis may also be consistent with other views (where have you read this before?).
Maxim 9: "The Monkey's Paw
| “ | Deception efforts may produce subtle and unwanted side effects. Planners should be sensitive to such possibilities and, where prudent, take steps to minimize these counterproductive aspects. | ” |
Deception security is one of the causes of such side-effects. One of the cardinal principles of deception folklore is that deception security is of the
