| “ | authorities who were unaware of Hall's efforts concluded that the Germans must be intending an
invasion of England, giving rise to the worst scare in 8ritain in World War I. Hall could not be absolutely certain that his efforts were the only cause of the German movements / and so he had to watch in silence. |
” |
Another example of a possible unwanted side effect of a deception operation occurred fairly frequently in World War II. As Cruickshank notes ( 61);
| “ | When the propagandists implemented a deception plan they had to steer a difficult middle course
between convincing the Germans that an Allied attack was imminent, and encouraging resistance groups to go into action in support of an attack that would never materialize, who would then find themselves exposed to the full weight of German reprisals. In any case, it was bad for morale if hopes of liberation were raised by the voice of London only to be dashed... But in France PWE had already cried 'Wolf' twice... and there was a real danger that French resistance would cease to believe anything London said. |
” |
Fortunately, this problem was anticipated and elegantly countered. In connection with the otherwise unsuccessful operation STARKEY, for instance, the BBC broadcast the subtle message (62);
| “ | Be careful of German provocation. We have learned that the Germans are circulating inspired rumours that we are concentrating armies on our coasts with | ” |
