C00036554
| “ | estimate the number of rockets stored east of the Seine, and hence to estimate the intended monthly rate of fire. The answer came out at about 800; after the war we found that the intended rate of fire had been 900 a month. We had therefore managed to achieve a 12 percent accuracy in our estimate, which would not have been possible had the Germans not tried to deceive us. | ” |
A final example offered in this connection dates from 1940/1 in East Africa. Gen. Wavell wanted the Italians to believe that he was planning to attack them in Abyssinia from the south of a position. In this way he hoped to divert Italian forces from the point of intended attack in the north. But, according to Mure (64 emphasis added):
| “ | The deception went very well and the Italians fell for the story of the attack in the south, with a
result which was exactly the reverse of what Wavell wanted. They draw back in the south, presumably in the expectation that the attack there was bound to succeed and the damage to their forces would be less if a withdrawal was made perhaps to a shorter line and no pitched battle was joined. At the same time, they sent what they could spare to reinforce the Northern Flank where they did not expect an attack but which was the true British objective. The valuable lesson learned was that the deception plan must be based on what you want the enemy do, never on what you want him to think. Next time, also in Abyss1n1a, Dudley arranged for the Italians to find out exactly where the British attack was to be made and this ensured that there was no opposition! |
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