CONTINGENT
331
CONTINGENT
(111 ;iMs, and some of the Gnostics, though not con-
' ! to a priestly class, was reckoned the means to a
r sanctification. Such widespread practice
- evidence of an instinctive feeling that the indul-
_ , . iif our sensual nature is in a measure degrading,
all' : that it is particularly incompatible with the perfect
[111 ity that should characterize one consecrated to the
" I -liip of the All Holy. That theattitude of anum-
f sects towards the lower side of human nature
iken on a character of unreasonable, and even
I.I. severity is clear. This is observed especially
' case of the Manicha'ans and branches of the
I ics in the p:xst, and of the Shakers and other un-
itant communities in our time. The law of the
•lie Church imposing a state of continence upon
misters and upon its religious orders of men
. . women is set forth in the articles Celib.^^cy of
nil I lergy; Religioi'S Orders; and Virginity.
r-.vo general objections are frequently urged against ill - 1 lite of continence. First, it is said that the con- ■ I of continence is detrimental to the well-being of iidividual. In such a statement, it will be fre- i ly found, continence is understood as an un- 1 1 celibacy, and such surely is not only a moral but \ sical evil most pernicious. Certain it is. how- I liat the self-sacrifice and control involved in true
- ii'nce finds fruitage in a greater measure of moral
1. Tlie words of Jesus Christ (Matt., xi.x, 12) 1 (> here appealed to. Moreover, the abstinence uh we speak is a condition of increased physical .r .and energy. Of this many savages are not un-
- iful; for among a number of these continence is
iiiiljosed upon the braves during times of war as a means of fostering and strengthening their daring and courage. \ second objection rests upon considera- tions of the social good. It is contended that a state of continence means failure to discharge the social obligation of conserving the species. But such an obligation falls, not upon every member of the com- munity, but upon society at large, and is amply discharged though there be individual exceptions. In- deed the non-fulfilment of this duty is never threats ened by a too general observance of sexual abstinence. On the contrarj- it is only the unlawful gratification of carnal passion that can menace the due growth of population. But it may be said that the practice of continence ^^"ithdraws from the function of reproduc- tion the worthier members of society — those whose possible offspring would be the most desirable citizens of the State. This contention, however, overlooks the social service of the example set by such observance — a service which, in view of the duty incumbent upon every individual of society of observing absolute chas- tity for periods of greater or less duration, is of highest value.
St. Thomas. Stimma Theol.. II-II, Q. civ, a. 1. ad 4; Q. chi, a. 1, ad 4; Aristotle. The I^'icomachean Ethics, Bk. VII; EsCHBvCH, Quttstiones Phystologico- Morales: Westerm.\rck, The fiitlory of Human Marriage (Ix)ndon. 1891); CR-\wley, The Mystic Rose (New York. 1902); Northcote. Christianity and S,x Probtems (Philadelphia, 1906); Scott, The Sexual In- •tinel (New York. 1899).
John Webster Melody.
Contingent (Lat. contingere, to happen). — Aside
from its spcondarj- and more obvious meaning (as, for
instance, its qualification of the predicable accident,
of a class of modal propositions, and so on), the pri-
jinarj' and technically philosophical use of the term is
jfor one of the supreme divisions of being, that is, con-
jtingent being, as distinguished from necessary being.
jIn this connexion the meaning of the term maj'be
jconsidered objectively, and the genesis of the idea
subjectively.
' Oh]ectirehj (ontologically) the contingent may be I viewed: (1) in the purely ideal or possible order, and jit is then the conceptual note or notes between which and existence in the actual order there is no contra-
diction, and which consequently admits of, though it
does not demand, actualization. It is thus coexten-
sive with possible being and is called the absolutely
contingent. (2) Considered in the order of actual ex-
istence, the contingent is that being whose essence, as
such, does not include existence and which, therefore,
does not, as such, demand existence but is indifferent
to be or not to be. This is called relatively contin-
gent and the term is usually employed in this sense.
Everj' finite existent being is thus contingent, though
likewise hypothetically necessary, in that having ex-
istence it cannot at the same time and imder the same
aspect not have it: inasmuch, too. a-s it is determined
by proximately.and hence relatively, necessitated ante-
cedents. (3) In regard to its subject — be this sub-
stance or accident — contingency may relate to action
as well as to existence, and it then signifies that the
subject (agent) is as yet undetermined, either intrin-
sically, as inthefree agent, or extrinsically, as are nec-
essitated causes. (4) Since the essence of the contin-
gent does not contain the reason of its existence, that
reason must be sought in an outside eflicient cause,
which cause, if in turn contingent, must show reason
for its existence in some other antecedent cause, and
so on until ultimately a being is reached whose essence
includes existence, a first cause whose existence is
underived, a being which is necassary and absolute.
This argument from contingent to the necessarj' being is not, as Kant maintained, the well-known ontological argument formulated by St. .-Vnselm and others to prove the existence of God. The latter argu- ment passes illogically from the ideal concept of the infinite to the objective actual existence of the in- finite, while the argument from contingent (finite) to the necessary (infinite) being, proceeds from the ob- jective actual contingent (dependent, conditioned) to the existence of an adequate cause thereof. The in- ference is based on an objective ai)j)lication of the principle of causality and involves no leap from a sub- jective phenomenon (idea) to an objective realized content. The argument supposes, it is true, the real existence of contingent being and that existence is denied by many thinkers, notably by pantheists, materialists, and determinists generally. Kant re- duces both contingency and necessity to mere mental forms or categories under which the mind views the world of phenomena but which it has no means of knowing to be objective. Xecessarj' being, therefore, ontologically and objectively precedes the contingent, since the latter has the sole ultimate reason both of its intrinsic consistency (possibility) and of its actual ex- istence in the former — actus absolute prace<iit poten- tiam. In the order, however, of man's knowledge, the contingent falls primarily under experience.
Subjectively. — Like everj' other conce]]t, that of the contingent is originally derived from external and internal experience. Adverting to the changes occur- ring in the world of sensuous phenomena antl to the interdependencies thereof, the intellect easily, almost intuitively, discerns that, while the given events are the necessitated consequences of similarly necessi- tated antecedents, each number of the series, by the very fact of its being thus conditioned, does not con- tain within itself the adequate ground of its existence. The intellect having spontaneously abstracted this note of dependence and ontologically reflecting there- on sees its application to every finite subject not only existent but likewise possible; sees, at least by an easy process of reasoning, that no such subject contains within itself the reason why it exists, under the pre- cise limitations of substance and accidents which it actually possesses. However, to assure this concept and to discern precisely and explicitly the contingency of the finite and the consequent indifference of its essence to exist or not to exist, the sciences, physical and biological, are called to testify; and each declares the dependence and conditionality of its respective
