HABIT
101
HABIT
movements, and the subsequent idea of success asso-
ciated with them. Moreover a number of such habits
are made use of under the guidance of the mind. Tlius
the acquired facility for writing is adapted to the
ideas to be expressed; fencing consists in the adapta-
tion of certain movements facilitated by habit to the
perceived or foreseen movements of the adversary.
They are therefore mixed habits of organism and mind.
Physiological habit supposes that an action, after being performed, leaves some trace in the organism, especially in the nervous system. In the present stage of physiological science, the nature of these traces cannot be determined with certainty. By some they are described as persisting movements and vibrations; by others, as fixed impressions and struc- tural modifications; by others finally, as tendencies and dispositions to certain functions. These views are not exclusive, but may be combined, for the dis- position, which has a more direct reference to future processes, may result from permanent impressions and movements, which have special reference to past processes. Somewhat metaphorically, physiological habit has also been explained as a canalization, or the creation of paths of least resistance which the nervous energy tends to follow.
III. Psychologically habit signifies the acquired facility of conscious processes. The education of the senses, association of ideas, memory, mental attitudes derived from experience and from studies general or special, the powers of attention, reflection, reasoning, insight, etc., and all these complex factors which form man's frame of mind and character, such as strength of will, weakness or obstinacy, irascibility or calmness, likes and dislikes, prejudices, and so on, are due largely to habits intentionally or unintentionally con- tracted. Owing to the great variety of conscious processes and the complexity of their determinants, it is difficult to reduce the psychological effects of habit to universal laws. The statement frequently made that habit lessens consciousness cannot be accepted without qualification; for sometimes the being accustomed to a stimulus means ceasing to have a clear consciousness of it, as in the case of the ticking of a clock which little by little ceases to be perceived distinctly, while sometimes on the contrary it means an increase of consciousness, as in the case of the developed keenness of the musician's ear in discrimi- nating sounds of slightly different pitch. Here a few distinctions must be kept in mind. First, between prolonged sensation, producing fatigue and conse- quently dullness of the sense-organ, and repeated sensation allowing sufficient rest. A second, between mental processes in which the mind is chiefly passive, and those in which it is chiefly active, as habit lessens passive and augments active sensitiveness. Finally one must see whether conscious processes are ends or simply means. Compared to the quality of the sounds to be produced, the special activity of the pianist's fingers or the singer's vocal organs is but a means to an end. Hence the musician becomes less conscious of this activity but more conscious of its result. In any case, since the energy flows naturally in the wonted direction, effort and attention are in inverse ratio to habit.
To pleasures as a rule applies the proverb " Assueta vilescunt" (Familiarity breeds contempt). By being repeated the same experience loses its novelty, which is one of the elements of pleasure and interest. But the rapidity of the decrease depends, not only on the frequency of the repetitions, but also on the wealth and variety contained in the experiences; hence it is that some musical compositions become tiresome much sooner than others in which the mind continues to discover some new pleasurable element. Pleasures resulting from the satisfaction of periodical wants, like resting or eating, undergo no change from the mere fact of repetition. Inclinations (i. e. desire and aver-
sion) decrease ; desires frequently change into needs of,
or unconscious cravings after, experiences which
formerly were pleasurable, but have now become taste-
less or are even known to be injurious. Persons or
things habitually met with, even if they are the source
of no pleasure, are missed if they happen to disappear.
Painful impressions become less keen unless they are
increased in reality or exaggerated by the imagination.
By exercise mental activity is strengthened in propor-
tion to natural dispositions and to the quantity and
quality of the energy employed. Hence habit is a
force which impels to act, diminishes the strength of
the will, and may become so strong as to be almost
irresistible.
IV. From the point of view of ethics, the main division of habits is into good and bad, i. e. into virtues and vices, according as they lead to actions in con- formity with or against the rules of morality. It is needless to insist on the importance of habit in moral conduct; the majority of actions are performed under its influence, frequently without reflection, and in accordance with principles or prejudices to which the mind has become accustomed. The actual dictates of an upriglit conscience are dependent on intellectual haljits, especially those of rectitude and honesty without which it happens too often that reason is used, not to find out what is right or wrong, but to justify a course of action one has taken or wishes to take. Custom also is an important factor, as that which is of frequent occurrence, even if known at first to be wrong, little by little becomes familiar, and its commission no longer produces in us feelings of shame or remorse. The voice of conscience is stifled; it ceases to give its warning, or at least no attention is paid to it.
By lessening freedom, habit also lessens the actual responsibility of the agent, for actions are less per- fectly attended to, and in varying degrees escape the control of the will. But it is important to note the distinction between habits acquired and retained knowingly, voluntarily, and with some foresight of the consequences likely to result, and habits acquired unconsciously, without our noticing them, and there- fore without our thinking of the possible consequences. In the former case, actions good or bad, though actu- ally not quite free, are nevertheless imputable to the agent, since they are voluntary in their cause, that is, in the implied consent given them at the beginning of the habit. If on the contrary the will had no part at all in acquiring or retaining the habit, actions proceed- ing from it are not voluntary, but, as soon as the exist- ence and dangers of a bad habit are noticed, efforts to uproot it become obligatory.
V. Between the child and the adult there is not merely a difference in the quantity of energy, bodily and mental, which they command, but especially a difference of adaptability, co-ordination or habit, thanks to which such energy is made more available for a definite purpose. Growth or increase and develop- ment or organization must proceed together. The main end of education is to direct the harmonious develop- ment of all the child's faculties according to their rela- tive importance, and thus to do for the child that which it is not yet able to do for itself, namely to fit its various energies for future use, and to select from among the tendencies deposited in its nature those which are to he cultivated and those which are to be destroyed. While the work must proceed gradually according to the increasing capacities of the child, the fact must always be kept in view that in early years both organism and mind are plastic and more easily influenced. Later their power of adaptability is much less, and frequently the learning of a new habit implies the difficult task of breaking off an old one.
As the complexity of functions increases, it becomes imperative, as far as possible, that the new elements find at once their proper place and associations, and
