seemed suddenly to adopt a policy at variance with her former obstinate and haughty tone toward America, and there was no longer any trouble about the western boundaries. In addition to the views which the British negotiators expressed, we may well conjecture that there were others to which no public expression was given.
It was no part of British policy to build up either France or Spain in America, and it was, perhaps, fortunate that France took a decided and active part in urging the claims of Spain. The British leaders saw in it an attempt to gain a foothold east of the Mississippi over territory which Great Britain had been accustomed to regard as her own. It was less galling to her pride to yield it to America than to extend the dominions of Spain at the demand of France. In addition to this, the British statesmen believed that the American republics could not hold together, and confidently expected that in a short time some, if not all of them, would return to the mother country. They were already quarreling among themselves over this very territory, and doubtless the quarrel was considered abroad as more dangerous than it really was. Was it not better for Great Britain to leave them this bone of contention than to cure their quarrels by removing the cause? It had already delayed the Union for many years and was still an unsettled question. Would not the quarrel be renewed with greater violence as soon as the pressure of a foreign war was removed? If these states should return they would bring this territory back with them. Besides, a liberal policy and the decision of this point in her favor against the wishes of France and Spain, would tend to detach America from her allies, and restore confidence in the mother country. On the other hand, Great Britain could not hope, and perhaps did not wish, to establish permanently cordial relations with France and Spain. Influenced by considerations of this nature, and in accordance with the heroic
