haps more might be accomplished by holding out Florida as a prize than by yielding it as a purchase.
Napoleon now entered on the campaign in which he crushed the power of Prussia. November 2ist he issued the famous Berlin decree, in retaliation for Great Britain’s orders blockading the French and German coast. Great Britain replied by the "Orders in Council." These arbitrary proceedings violated every principle of justice, and especially affected the merchant marine of the United States, then the main carriers of the world. They fully justified war against either or both offenders.
The orders of Great Britain bore with especial hardship against American trade, and were arrogantly enforced. In addition, the impressment of seamen from American vessels by British cruisers had long been a source of irritation and humiliation to the United States. An immense merchant marine, without a navy to protect it, and which was rapidly supplanting English commerce, excited both the envy and cupidity of Great Britain, and led to acts which differed from piracy only in being perpetrated under her title as "mistress of the seas."
The remonstrances of the United States were unheeded either by France or Great Britain, and Jefferson was left to choose his remedy. Great Britain seemed to invite war, and Napoleon shaped his course with a view to force the United States into a war with Great Britain. To find redress without war was now the object of Jefferson’s diplomacy. The aggressive character of American negotiation now gave way to the defensive. The acquisition of Florida yielded in importance to the protection of American shipping. Napoleon replied to every remonstrance, that as soon as the United States should declare war against the aggressor, England, he was ready to grant every demand. He was ready to withdraw the Berlin decrees, to assure the acquisition of Florida and Canada, to enter into an alliance against Great Britain. The temptation was great, but Jefferson ad-
