ever, peace efforts were renewed (as we shall see), and with the same disappointing result.
The position assumed by the Federal administration in the beginning of the conflict of the armies in 1860 that the struggle was not public war, but was only an insurrection, involved it in a series of perplexities. Among these the proper treatment of persons captured with arms in their hands was a question of great difficulty unless the admission of public war was allowed. Upon the insurrection theory it was broadly said in Washington that those who were captured should be tried as traitors and suffer the penalties prescribed against rebels, and unfortunately it was at first feared that any concession of belligerent rights made by the United States would encourage European nations to go further and recognize the Confederate States government. The weakness of President Buchanan in attempting to counterpoise secession and coercion as coequally wrong, was followed by the double dealing of Seward in the peace negotiations, and then after battle had begun the most momentous interests were made to turn on political phrases which were carefully employed. Thus, Confederate privateering was officially called piracy, notwithstanding the protest of every court in Europe, and the first crews captured were ironed as felons. From this first false position the administration was compelled to retreat. In pursuance of this mistaken policy the Southern soldiers first captured in battle were denied exchange as such because of the same fear that the exchange of prisoners according to the usages of war might in some way be regarded as a concession that public war existed. The cruel course produced hardships which brave men suffered, and embarrassed military officers who preferred to wage war in due form. Humanity required the evasion of this political policy, and under its inspiration swaps were made by commanders on the field instead of exchanges, which the common law of all great wars requires. After many
