and Magruder was sent to him. Neither of these divisions was engaged on the 30th. Huger reported his march obstructed by trees thrown across the road, had an affair with outposts in his front, and was so badly balked in his march that he did not reach the field of battle on the 30th. Jackson, whom Franklin stopped at White Oak, served no other purpose on the 3oth that to keep Franklin’s division and his artillery too busily engaged to join the five divisions at Frayser’s farm. All this reflects the highest credit upon the military genius of McClellan, who directed the details of his masterly retreat.
Longstreet, in advance, came up with the Federal battle line, as above described, on the morning of the 30th. A. P. Hill was closed up on his march. Finding the enemy drawn up across his road, in front of the point where the Charles City road falls into it (Long Bridge road), he put his division in line of battle, with A. P. Hill in reserve, and waited anxiously to hear from Huger on his left, and Magruder and Holmes on his right. He felt sure that Jackson, crossing White Oak, would be in time to fall on the Federal right and rear. General Lee and the President were both at his headquarters when a Federal battery opened in his immediate front. A shell from this battery exploded so near the group as to wound one of the couriers and kill several horses. At this moment (4 p. m.) artillery fire was heard back on the Charles City road, and Longstreet, taking it for the signal of Huger that he was near at hand, ordered one of his batteries to reply, and the battle of Frayser’s Farm was opened. The artillery on the Charles City road was Huger’s affair with one of Franklin’s outposts. R. H. Anderson, the senior brigadier, was assigned by Longstreet to the immediate direction of his front, and Colonel Jenkins commanded the South Carolina brigade, the first engaged in battle. He was ordered to silence the battery in front with his sharpshooters, but he preferred to capture it, and led his brigade forward, charged, drove
