Page:Cyclopaedia, Chambers - Volume 2.djvu/12

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ICHTHYOPHAGI, Fi/h-ea-ers, the yarne given to a People, or rather to feveral different People, who lived wholly on Fillies. Pliny places them in the Provinces of Kanau'm and Xantim. Agatharcydes calls all the Inhabi- tants from the Annans and Ethiopia to the Indus, Gednjia, Caramama, Perjia, and all the neighbouring Iilands, by the Name Icbtbyophagi. From the Accounts given us of them by Herodotus, Straho, Solium, Plutarcb,&c. it appears, indeed, that they had Cattle, but that they made no ufe of them excepting to feed their Fifties withal. They made their Houfes of large Fi/h-Eoncs, the Ribs of Whales ferving them for their Beams. The Jaws of thefe Ani- mals (erred them for Doors, and the Mortars wherein they pounded their Fifth, and baked it at the Sun, were nothing elfe but their Vertebra. The word is derived from theGrce^, !*», Pifcis, Fifi, and tpippxi, edo, I eat.

ICONOCLASTES, a Breaker of Images ; a Name which the Church of Rome attributes to all who reject the Ufe of Imagcsin religious Matters ; in which Senfe, not only the Reformed, but alfo the Eajiern Churches are called Jconodajies, and efteem'd by them Heretics, as op- pofing the Worfhip of the Images of God and the Saints, and breaking their Figures and Reprefen rations in Churches. The word is formed from the Greek, Hmv, Imago, Intake, and KKtiHV, rumpere, to break.

ICONOGRAPHIA, Description of Images, or of an- tient Statues of Marbles and <"■• nper, of Bulls and Semi- bulls, of Penates, Paintings in Frefco, Mofaic Works, and antient Pieces of Mignature. The word is derived from time, Imago, and y£?.?u, fcribo.

ICONOLATER, one who worlhips Images, a Name which the JcotioclaP.es give to thofe of the Romifl Commu- nion, on account of their adoring Images, and of render- ing to them the Worfhip only due to God. The word comes from the Greek <?,wv and h'Jpuw, celo.

ICONOLOGIA, Interpretation of various antient Ima- ges, Monuments, and Emblems, from the Greek eimv, and As^w, I [peak.

ICOSIHEDRON, is a Golid, which confilts of twenty triangular Py- ramids, whofc Vertices meet in the Center of a Sphere, that is ima- gined to circumfcribe it, and therefore have their Height and Bafes equal ; wherefore the Solidity of one of thole Pyramids, multiplied by twenty, the Num- 'ber of Bafes, gives the folid Content of the icofibedron. This Figure being drawn on Palteboard, cut half through, and then folded up neatly together, will reprefent an Icofibedron,

ICTERIC, a Term in Phylic, apply'd to fuch Perfons as have the Jaundice, which the Latins call Icterus, Aurigo, or Morbus Regius. IBeric Medicines are fuch as are pre- fcribed in Cafes of the jaundice. The Word is derived from the Greek ix-rep©", which fome derive further from i)c7K, a kind of Weafel with yellow Eyes.

ICTHYOCOLLA, ifinglafs : Schroder fays, that this is made from a Fiih, which is common in the Danube ; the Fifti having no Bones but about the Head. After it is cut in fmall pieces, they boil it in Water to a thick Jelly, which is fpread abroad and dried, then rolled up, and brought to us in the form we fee it in the Shops. It is of a very glutinous Quality, and confequently good in all Diforders, which arife from too thin and iharp a State of the Fluids. The Word is derived from the Greek i^fluf, Pifcis, Fiih, and xiihha, Gluten, Glue.

IDEA, A Term by which we mean that immediate Object of the Mind about which we arc employ'd when we perceive or think : Thus, when we look at the Sun, we do not fee that Luminary itfelf, but its Image or Appear- ance convey'd to the Soul by the,Organ of Sight , and this Image we call Idea. The Origin of Ideas has been a long time difputed among the Philofophers. The Peripa- tetics maintain, that external Objects emit Species that refemble them all around, and that thefe Species lin- king on our Senfes, are by them tranfmitted to the Un- derftanding ; that being material and fenlible, they are rendered intelligible by the active Intellect, and are at length received by the paffive. Others are of opinion, that our Souls have of themfelvcs the power of producing Ideas of Things that we would think upon - and that they are excited to produce them by the Impreffions which Objefls make on the Body, tho thefe Impreffions are not Images in any refpefl like the Objefls that occalioned them. And in this, fay they, it is, that Man is made after the Image of God, and that he partakes of his Power ; for as God made all things out of nothing, and can re- duce 'em to nothing when he pleafes, fo Man can create as many Ideas as he pleafes, and annihilate them when he he has done. Others maintain, that the Mind has no oc-

caficn for any thing befides itfelf to perceive Obicfls ; and that by confidering itfelf and its own Perfections, it is able to difcover all things that are without. Others with- Vefcartes hold, that our Wear were created and born along with us. Makbranch and his Followers aflert, that God has in liimfelf the ideas of all Beings that he hath cre- ated ; that thus he fees all things, in confidering his Per- fections to which they correfpond ; and that as he is inti- mately united to our Souls by his Prefence, our Mind fees and perceives things in Him which reprefent created Be- ings -, and that it is thus we come by all our Ideas. He adds, that tho we fee all fenfible and material things in God, yet that we have not our Scniarions in him. When we perceive any fenfible Objefl, in our Perception is in- cluded both a Senfation and a pure Idea. The Senfation is a Modification of the Soul, and it is God who caufes it in us: but for the Idea join'd with the Senfation, it is in God, and it is in him that we fee it. The Carte/tans di- ftinguiftt three kinds of Ideas. The firfl innate, and fuch is that we have of God, as of a Being infinitely perfefl. The fecond adventitious, which the Mind receives in proportion as bodily Objefls prefent themfelvcs to our Senfes. Such is the Idea of Body, Sound, Figure, Light, S?c. The third, according to thefe Philofophers, are fac- titious, which are thofe which, the Mind forms, by uniting and affembling the Ideas which it already had : and thefe are called complex. But our great Mr. Locke feems to have put this Matter out of difpute, having made it ap- pear that all our Ideas are owing to our Senles ; and that all innate, created, factitious, igc. Ideas, are mere Chime- ra's. He proves, that our Mind has not abfolutely any Ideas befides thofe prefented to it by the Senfes, and thofe which it forms by its own Operations, on thofe others which the Senfes (uniifli. So that a Man deftitute of one of his Senfes, would never have any Idea belonging to that Senfe; and fuppofing him deftitute of all the Senfes, he would never have any Idea at all : External Objeas having no other way of producing Ideas in him, but by means of Senfation. He would have no Idea, not even of Reflexion, becaufe in wanting all Senfation, he wants that which fhould excite in him the Operations of his Mind, which are the Objects of his Reflexion. 'Tis plain there- fore there is no innate Idea ; no general Truth, or firft Principle inherent in the Soul, and created with it; no immediate Object of the Mind before it had perceived external Objefls by means of the Senfes, and refiefled on that Perception. Thofe Ideas only feem to be innate, be- caufe we find we have them as foon as we come to the TJfe of Reafon, but are, in effefl, what we formed from the Ideas wherewith the Mind was infenfibly filled by the Senfes. Thus, when the Mind is employ'd about fenfible Objefls, it comes by the Ideas of bitter, fwect, yellow, hard, Be which we call Senfation ; and when employ'd about its own Operations, perceiving and reflefling on them, as employ'd about the Ideas before got by Senfa- tion, we get the Ideas of Perception, Thinking, Doubting Willing, Sjc. which we call inward Senfation. or Re- flexion : And thefe two, viz. external material Things as the Objefls of Senfation, and the Operations of our own Minds as the Objefls of Reflexion, are the only Originals whence all our Ideas have their Rife. When we have confidered thefe, and their feveral Modes and Combina- tions, we mall find they contain our whole Stock of Ideas -, inlomuch, that the Undemanding does not feem to have the leaft Glimmering of any Ideas that it did not receive from one of thofe Sources. And thus far the Mind ap- pears merely paffive, as not having it in" its power to chule whether it will have thefe firft Beginnings or Ma- terials of Knowledge, or not. For the Objefls of Senfe will obtrude their Ideas upon the Mind, and the Opera- tions of the Mind will not let us be without fome (how- ever obfeure) Notion of them.

The fame excellent Author diftinguifties Ideas into two kinds, Ms. Srniple and Complex. Of the former kind are all thofe Ideas which come into the Mind by Senfation : And though the Qualities of Bodies that af- fect our Senfes are in the things themfelves fo mix'd and united, that there is no Separation between them ; yet the Ideas they produce in the Mind are fimple and unmix d. Again, fome Ideas we acquire purely by means of one Senfe, as the Ideas of Colours only by the Eye, of Sounds by the Ear, of Heat by the Touch, iSe. Other Ideas we gain by feveral Senfes, as of Space Extenfion, Figure, Reft, Motion, l3c. for thefe have their Effefl both on the Sight and the Touch. There are other fimple Ideas, again, form'd in the Mind both bv Senfation and Reflexion jointly, as Pleafure, Pain, Power, Eaft'ence Unity, Succeffion, &c. And of fome of thefe kinds of Ideas are all, or at leaft the moft considerable of thofe fimple Ideas wh.ch the Mind hath, and out of which is made all its other Knowledge. The better to compre- hend the Nature of thefe fimple Ideas, it will be conve- nient