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nient to diftinguifh between them as they are Ideas or Perceptions in our Minds, and as they are Modifications of the Bodies that caufe fuch Perceptions in us ; that we may not think, as is ufually done, that they are exactly the Images and Refemblanccs of fomething inherent in the Subject : for moft of thofe of Senfation, are in the Mind no more the Likenefsof any thing exiting without us, than the Mames that {land for 'em are the Likenefsof the Ideas. But here the Qualities of Bodies which pro- duce thofe Ideas in our Minds, are to be diltinguifh'd into Primary and Secondary. Primary Qualities are fuch as are utterly infeparable from the Body, in what State fo- ever it be ; and fuch as ourSenfes constantly find in every Particle of Matter, which are Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, Mobility, and the like. Secondary Qualities are fuch as are, in reality, nothing in the Objects themfelves, but only Powers to produce various Senfations in us by means of their primary Qualities ; that is, by the Figure, Bulk, Texture, gfe. of their Particles, as Colour, Sounds, Tafle, l£>c. Now the Ideas of primary Qualities are in fome fenie Refemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exHl in the Bodies themfelves ■■> but the Ideas produced in us by thofe fe.ondary Qualities have no Refemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our Ideas exilling in the Bodies themfelves that occafion them. They are in the Bodies we denominate from them, only a Power to produce thofe Senfations in us; and what is fweet, warm, blue, kSc. in thtldca, is no more than the Bulk, Figure and Motion of the Particles of the Bodies themfelves that we call fo.
The Mind hath fcveral Faculties of managing theie fimple Ideas that are worthy of notice: as, i. That of decerning juflly and diltinguifhmg rightly between one and another; in this confilts the Accuracy of Judgment. z. That of comparing them one with another in reflect of Extent, Degree, Time, Place, or any other Circum- flances of Relation or Dcpendance one on another. 5. The Faculty of compounding or putting together the fimple Ideas received by Senfation and Reflexion, in order to make complex ones. 4. Children by repeated Senfations having got fome Ideas fix'd in their Memories, by degrees learn the Life of Signs; and when they can fpeak ar- ticulately, they make ufe of Words to fignify their Ideas toothers: Hence, the Ufe of Words being to itand as out- ward Marks of our internal We.ir,and thofe Ideas being taken from particular things; if every particular JV/ea that we take in, fliould have a particular Name affixed to it, Names would grow endlefs.To prevent thisInconvenience,the Mind has another Faculty whereby it can make the particular Ideas received from fuch ObjecTs, become general ; which is done, by confidering them as they are in the Mind fuch Appearances, fe par ate from all other Exitlences and Cir- cumflances of Exiirence, as Time, Place, and other con- comitant Ideas-, and this is called Abflra&ion ; whereby Ideas taken from particular Things become general Re- prefentatives of all of that kind, and their Names, general Names applicable to whatever exifls conformable to fuch abflracl Ideas. Thus the fame Colour being obferved to- day in Chalk or Snow, which we obferved yeflerday in Paper or Milk, we confider that Appearance alone, make it a Reprefentative of all the fame Kind, and give it the Name of Whitenefs: By which Sound we always fignify the fame Quality, wherefoeverto be met with or imagined.
From the Power which the Mind has of combining, comparing, and feparating or abflracling the fimple Ideas, which it acquires by Senfation and Reflexion, all its complex Ideas are formed; and as before in the Percep- tion of Ideas, the Underllanding was paffive, fo here 'tis aclive, exerting the Power it hath in the feveral A£h and Faculties abovementioned, in order to frame compound Ideas. All complex Ideas, rho their Number be infinite, and Variety endlefs, yet may they be all reduced to thefe three Heads, viz. Modes, Subflances, and Relations. Modes are fuch complex Ideas, as however compounded, are not fuppofed to exifl by themfelves, but are confider'd as Dependencies on, or Affeftions of Subflances : Such arc the ideas fignified by the words Triangle, Gratitude, Mur- der, &c. And thefe Modes are of two kinds: s. Such as are only Variations, or different Combinations of the fame fimple Idea, without the Mixture of any other, as a Dozen, a Score, i£c and thefe may be called fimple Modes. 2. There are others compounded of fimple Ideas of feveral forts put together, to make one complex one, as Eeautv, Theft. Subflances have their Ideas from fuch Combinations of fimple Ideas, as are taken to reprefent di- ftincl particular thin.es, fubfifring by themfelves, in which the fuppofed or confuted Idea of Subflancc, fuch as it is, is always the firfland chief. Relations are a kind of complex Ideas, arifing from the Confederation or Comparifon of one Idea with another. Of thefe, fome only depend on the Equality or Exccfs of the fame fimple Idea in feveral Sub- jeas, and thefe may be called proportional Relations,
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fuch as equal, more, bigger, Tweeter. Another occafion of comparing things together, is owing to the Circum- ftances of their Origin and Beginning ; which, not being afterwards to be altered, make the Relations depending thereon as latting as the Subjects to which they belong. Thus it is with natural Relations, fuch as Father, Mother, Uncle, Coufin, iSc. Thus alfo it is with Relations by In- ftitution, as Prince and People, General and Army, S?c. As to moral Relations, they are the Conformity or Dila- greement of Mens free ASions lo Laws and Rules, whe- ther Human or Divine.
Further, with regard to our Ideas it may be obferved, that fome are clear and diftinfl, others obfeure and confuted. Our fimple Ideas are clear, when they continue fuch as the" Objects reprefent them to us, when our Organs of Senfa- tion are in a good Tone and Order, when our Mcmoriet retain them, and can produce and prcl'ent them to the Mind whenever it hath occafion to confider them ; and when, with this, the Mind fees that thefe fimple Ideas are fevcrally different one from another: The contrary to which, is what we call Obfcurity and Confufion.
Again, Ideas, with refpect to the Objects whence they are taken, or which they are fuppofed to reprefent, come under a threefold Diltinction ; being, i. Either real or fantailical. 2. True or falfe. 3. Adequate or inadequate. By real Ideas is meant fuch as have a Foundation in Nature, fuch as have a Conformity with the real Being or Exigence of Things, or with their Architypes. Fantailical are fuch as have no Foundation in Nature, nor any Conformity with that Being to which they are referred as their Architypes.
Now if we examine our feveral kinds of Ideas, we /hall find that, 1. All our fimple Ideas ire real 5 not that they are Images or Reprefentations of what does exill, but as they are the certain Effects of Powers in Things without us, or- dained by our Maker to produce in us fuch Senfations. They are real Ideas in us, in regard, by them we diftinguifli the Qualities that are really in the Bodies themfelves: their Reality lit^ in the Heady Correfpondence they have with the dihinct Conllitutions of real Beings, but whether with thofe Conllitutions to Caufes or Patterns, it matters not, fo long as they are constantly produced by them. As to complex Ideas, in regard they are arbitrary Combi- nations of fimple Ideas put together, and united under one general Name, in forming whereof the Mind ufeth its own Liberty, fome arc found real, and fome imaginary. 1. Mix'd Modes and Relations having no other Reality than what they have in -the Minds of Men, are real ; no- thing more being required to their Reality, but a Po'ffibi- lity of exilling conformable to them. Thefe Ideas being themfelves Architypes, cannot differ from their Archi- types, and fu cannot be chimerical, unlefs any one jum- bles inconfitlent Ideas in them: Indeed, thofe that have Names affign'd to them, ought to have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of thofe Names, to prevent their appearing fantailical. 1. Our complex Ideas of Subilances being made in reference to things exilling without us whofe Reprefentations they are thought, are no further
real, than as they are Combinatii united and co-exi"
1 are Combinations of fimple Ideas really (ling in things without us. Thofe are fan- tailical, that are made up of feveral Ideas that never were found united, as Centaur, ££c.
As to true and falfe Ideas, it may be obferved, that Truth and Fallliood in Propriety of Speech belong on- ly to Propofitions; and when Ideas are term'd true of falfe, there is fome tacit Propolition, which is the Foun- dation of that Denomination. Our Ideas being nothing elfe bur Appearances or Perceptions in the Mind, can no more be laid to be true or falfe, than fingle Names of things can be faid to be fo ; for Truth and Falfhood lying always in fome Affirmation or Negation, our Ideas are not capable of them, till the Mind paffeth feme Judg- ment of them. In a Metaphyseal Senfe they may be (aid to be true, i.e. to be really fuch as they exill ; tho in things called true, even in that Senfe, there feems to be a fecret Reference to our Went, look'd upon as the Standards of that Truth ; which amounts to a mental Pro- polition. When the Mind refers its Ideas to any thing ex- traneous to it, they are then capable of being true or falfe, becaufe in fuch a Reference, the Mind makes a ta- cit Suppofition of their Conformity to that thing 5 which Supposition, as it is true or falfe, fo the Ideas themfelves come to be denominated. Real Ideas are either adequate or inadequate. Thofe are adequate which perfectly re- prefent thofe Architypes which the Mind fuppofeth them taken from, and which it makes them ftand for. Inade- quate are fuch as do but partially or incompleatly re- prefent thofe Architypes to which they are referred. See adequate, Truth, T/eafure, Name, Kjiozvledge, AJJhciation Modes.
IDENTITATE NOMINIS, is a Writ that fiesforhim who upon a Capias or Exigent is taken and committed to Prifon for another Man of the fame Name.
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