owing to the scantiness of the statements which we
have, and what belongs to this subject can be
merely indicated in this place. In the first place,
Theophrastus seems to have carried out still further
the grammatical foundation of logic and rhetoric,
since in his book on the elements of speech ( eV T<p
T6pl Tov yov aroix^itp, I. iv t<^ Trepl rwv rov
Koyov (TToix^iuv)^ respecting which again others
had written, he distinguished the main parts of
speech from the subordinate parts, and again, direct
(Kvpia Ae'lfs) from metaphorical expressions, and
treated of the affections (irddr}) of speech (Simpl.
in Categ. 8, Basil.), and further distinguished a
twofold reference of speech {axif^i'S) — to things
(7r^7/xaTo), and to the hearers, and referred poetry
and rhetoric to the latter (Ammon. de Interpr. 53;
Schol. in Arist. p. 108. 27). In what he taught
respecting judgment (eV t^j irepl Ka.ra.<^a.(riuis [woi
a7ro(^ao-€a)s] — de affirmalione ei negatione) he had
treated at length on its oneness (Alex, in Anal. Pr.
f. 128, 124 ; Schol. in Arist. p. 184. 24. 183, b. 2;
Boeth. de Interpr, pp. 291, 327), on the different
kinds of negation (Ammon. in Arist. de Interfr.
128, b. 129, 134; Schol. in Arist. p. 121. 18), and
on the difference between unconditioned and con-
ditioned necessity (Alex. I. c. f. 12. 6 ; Schol. in
Arist. p. 149. 44). In his doctrine of syllogisms
he brought forward the proof for the conversion
of universal affirmative judgments, differed from
Aristotle here and there in the laying down and
arranging the modioi the syllogisms (Alex. I. c. 14,
72, 73, 82. 22, b, 35; Boeth. deSi/U. categ. ii. 594.
5, f. 603, 615), partly in the proof of them (Alex.
I. c. 39, b), partly in the doctrine of miocture^ i. e.
of the influence of the modality of the premises
upon the modality of the conclusion (Alex. I. c. 39,
b. &c. 40, 42, 56, b. 82, 64, b. 51 ; Joh. Ph. xxxii,
b. &c.). Then in two separate works he had
treated of the reduction of arguments to the syllo-
gistic form {h.vqyfj.ivwv ywu els t^ ax'hf^'^Ta)
and on the resolution of them (Trepi avaKvaews
(XvXKoyKrfJiwv. Alex. 115); further, of hypothetical
conclusions (Alex, in Arist. Anal. Pr. 109, b. &c.
131, b. ; Joh. Phil. Ix. &c. Ixxv. ; Boeth. de Syll.
hypoth. p. 606). For the doctrine of proof, Galenus
quotes the second Analytic of Theophrastus, in
conjunction with that of Aristotle, as the best
treatises on that doctrine {de Hippocr. et Plat.Dogm.
ii. 2. p. 213, Lips. 253, Basil.) In different mo-
nographies he seems to have endeavoured to expand
it into a general theory of science. To this too
may have belonged the proposition quoted from his
Topics^ that the principia of opposites {rHv iuavriuv)
are themselves opposed, and cannot be deduced
from one and the same higher genus. (Simpl. in
Categ. f. 5 ; Schol. p. 89. 15 ; comp. Alex, in
Metaph. p. 342. 30, Bonitz.) For the rest, some
inconsiderable deviations from the Aristotelic definitions are quoted from the Topica of Theophrastus.
(Alex, in Top. 5, 68, 72, 25, 31.) With this
treatise, that upon ambiguous words or ideas (irepi
rod TToo-axcSs, ir. t. ttoAAoxcSs. Alex. ib. 83, 189),
which, without doubt, corresponded to the book E
of Aristotle's Metaphysics, seems to have been
closely connected.
Theophrastus introduced his Physics with the
proof that all natural existence, being corporeal,
that is composite, presupposes principia (Simpl. in
Pkys. f. 1,6, in Schneider v. 7), and before every-
thing else, motion, as the basis of the changes
common to all (ib. 5, 6; Schncid. ib. 6). Denying
THEOPHRASTUS.
the subsistence of space, he seems to have been
disposed, in opposition to the Aristotelic definition,
to regard it as the mere arrangement and position
(Ta|ts and i^^crtj) of bodies (Simpl. /.c. 149, b. 141;
Schneid. p. 213, f. 9, 8). Time he designated as
an accident of motion, without, as it seems, conceiving it, with Aristotle, as the numerical determination of motion. (Simpl. f. 87, b; Joh. 213. 4.)
He departed more widely from his master in his
doctrine of motion, since on the one hand he
extended it over all categories, and did not limit it
to those laid down by Aristotle (Simpl, ifi Categ.
Schneid. p. 212; comp. Simpl. in Phys. 94, 201,202,
1. Schneid. 214. 10); and on the other hand, while
he conceived it, with Aristotle, as an activity, not
carrying its own end in itself (areATjs), of that
which only exists potentially (Simpl. I. c. and f. 94,
1. Schneid. 11), and therefore could not allow that
the activity expended itself in motion, he also
recognised no activity without motion (Simpl. in
Categ. Schneid. 212. 2), and so was obliged to
refer all activities of the soul to motion, the desires
and affections to corporeal motion, judgment
(/cpiVejs) and contemplation to spiritual motion.
(Simpl. in Phys. 225 ; Schneid. 215. 13.) The
conceivableness of a spirit entirely independent of
organic activity, must therefore have appeared to
him very doubtful ; yet he appears to have con-
tented himself with developing his doubts and
difficulties on the point, without positively rejecting
it (Themist. in Arist. de An. 89, b. 91, b; Schneid.
215. 15). Other Peripatetics, as Dicaearchus,
Aristoxenus, and especially Straton, more unreservedly and unconditionally gave a sensualistic
turn to the Aristotelic doctrine. Theophrastus
seems, generally speaking, where the investigation
overstepped the limits of experience, to have shown
more acuteness in the development of difficulties
than in the solution of them, as is especially apparent in the fragment of his metaphysics. In a penetrating and unbiassed conception of phenomena, in acuteness of reflection and combination respecting
them and within their limits, in compass and certainty of experimental knowledge, he may have stood near Aristotle, if he did not come quite up to him : the incessant endeavour of his great master
to refer phenomena to their ultimate grounds, his
profundity in unfolding the internal connections
between the latter, and between them and pheno-
mena, were not possessed by Theophrastus. Hence
even in antiquity it was a subject of complaint that
Theophrastus had not expressed himself with pre-
cision and consistency respecting the Deity, and
had understood thereby at one time Heaven, at
another an (enlivening) breath {irvev^a^ Clem.
Alex. Protrept. p. 44. b; Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 13);
that he had not been able to comprehend a happi-
ness resting merely upon virtue (Cic. Acad. i. 10,
Tusc. V. 9), or, consequently, to hold fast by the
unconditional value of morality, and, although
blameless in his life, had subordinated moral re-
quirements to the advantage at least of a friend.
(A. Gell. N. A. i. 3. § 23), and had admitted in
prosperity the existence of an influence injurious
to them. (In particular, fault was found with his
expression in the Callisthenes, vitam regit fortuna
non sapientia, Cic. Tttsc. iii. 10 ; comp. Alex.
Aphrod. de Anima^ ii. extr.) That in the definition
of pleasure, likewise, he did not coincide with
Aristotle, seems to be indicated by the titles of
two of his writings, one of which treated of pleasure
Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 3.djvu/1102
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.
1090
THEOPHRASTUS.THEOPHRASTUS.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Dictionary_of_Greek_and_Roman_Biography_and_Mythology_%281870%29_-_Volume_3.djvu/page1102-1024px-Dictionary_of_Greek_and_Roman_Biography_and_Mythology_%281870%29_-_Volume_3.djvu.jpg)